COMMENTS
THE AFTERMATH OF CENTRAL BANK OF
DENVER: PRIVATE AIDING AND

ABETTING LIABILITY UNDER SECTION
10(b) AND RULE 10b-5
DAVID J. BAUM
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ....................................
I. Before Central Bank: Private Aiding and Abetting
Liability Under Section 10(b) ...................
A. Development of a Private Right of Action .......
B. Development of Aiding and Abetting Liability ....
C. Elements of Aiding and Abetting Liability .......
II. Central Bank: The Elimination of Aiding and
Abetting Liability Under Section 10(b) ............
A. The Road to CentralBank: The Gradual
Narrowing of the Securities Laws ..............
B. CentralBank of Denver v. FirstInterstateBank
ofDenver ................................
I. The Impact of CentralBank .....................
A. Aiding and Abetting Liability as a Private Cause
of Action ...............................
B. Alternative Theories of Liability ...............
C. Aiding and Abetting Liability as a Deterrent .....
IV. Recommendations ............................
A. Proposed Legislation .......................
1. Aiding and abetting liability ...............
2. Limited securities litigation reform ..........
B. Advantages of Legislative Reform ..............
Conclusion ......................................

1817

1818
1820
1820
1822
1825
1830
1830
1833
1838
1838
1840
1842
1843
1843
1844
1847
1850
1852

1818

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSrry LAW RmIW

[Vol. 44:1817

INTRODUCTION

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934' (the 1934
Act) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 101>52
prohibit the fraudulent sale or purchase of any security.3 Specifically,
section 10 (b) prohibits the direct and indirect use of any manipulative
or deceptive means to buy or sell a security.4 Securities trading is
further regulated by Rule 10b-5, which prohibits the use of any device
or scheme to defraud,5 the making of any material misrepresentation
or omission of fact,8 and the engagement in any activity or practice
that serves to defraud. 7 Though section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 do not
expressly provide for private civil remedies, the courts have recognized a private right of action in connection with primary violations
of these statutes for almost fifty years.8 For the past twenty-five years,
the courts have expanded the reach of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5

to include secondary participants in addition to the "controlling

1. Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or ofany facility of any national
securities exchange...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
2. Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or

instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national

securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994). Rule lOb-5 was promulgated by the SEC under its authority as
established in § 10(b). See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230.31 (1988) (explaining
background of § 10(b)).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.101>5.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1015(a).
6. 1&t § 240.10b-5(b).
7. lR. § 240.10b-5(c).
8. Se Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (stating that
implied private right of action under § 10(b) is based upon tort law); se also Superintendent
v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (stating that private right of action
exists under § 10(b)).
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persons" 9 expressly provided for in both the Securities Act of 1933
(the 1933 Act)"0 and the 1934 Act. 1 Since 1968, aiding and abetting liability has been a widely used and effective weapon against
securities fraud, allowing private plaintiffs to recover damages from
collateral participants such as accountants, 12 lawyers,' 3 and bankers.14 Frequently referred to as "deep pockets," these professionals
were favorite targets of plaintiffs seeking large recoveries or, as vras
often the case, the only source of recovery when the primary violator
was insolvent.15
Years ofjudicial acceptance of private aiding and abetting liability
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, however, recently ended with the

Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver 6 In its decision, the Court overturned years of lower
court precedent by holding that aiding and abetting liability as a

9. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (defining "controlling person" as person who "directly or
indirectly, controls any person liable under any provision of [the Securities Exchange Act of
1934] or of any rule or regulation thereunder.., unless the controlling person acted in good
faith and did not directly or indirectly induce... the violation"); id.§ 77o (defining"controlling
persons" as person who "by or through stock ownership, agency, or othenvise, or who, pursuant
to or in connection with an agreement or understandingwith one or more other persons by or
through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls any person liable under sections 77k
or 771 of [Securities Act of 1933]"); see also Wiley v. Hughes Capital Corp., 746 F. Supp. 1264.
1277 (D.N.J. 1990) (broadening basic definition of"controllingpersons" found in § 77o); Babst
v. Morgan Keegan Co., 687 F. Supp. 255, 262 (E.D. La. 1988) (expanding § 77o definition of
controlling persons);Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165, 1212 (C.D. Md. 1968)
(detailing "controlling persons" standard of § 77o as supplementing respondeat superior and
principles of agency), rev'd in part on other grounds,422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
11. See id § 77o (outlining liability of "controlling persons"); id. § 78t (defining term
.controlling person" for purposes ofsecurities laws); s=ealsoBrennan v. Midwestern United Life
Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 702, 728 (ND. Ind. 1968) (implying aiding and abetting liability against
insurance company under § 10(b) of 1934 Act), affd,417 F.2d 147 (7th Cr. 1969), ceu. denied,
397 U.S. 989 (1970).
12. SeP eg., Roberts v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 857 F.2d 646, 652-53 (9th Cir. 1988)
(finding that claim ofaiding and abetting violation of§ 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 against accountant
denied, 439 U.S. 1002 (1989); Rudolph v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
is valid cause of action), cert.
800 F.2d 1040, 1045 (11th Cir. 1986) (reversing lower court ruling holding that accountant
cannot be held liable for aiding and abetting securities violation), ont den"ed, 480 U.S. 946
(1987).
13. Cf.Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 463-64 (8th Cir. 1991) (alleging that attorney aided
and abetted securities fraud by helping to conceal fact that corporation was for sale); Barkerv.
Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490,492 (7th Cir. 1989) (alleging law firm aided
and abetted securities fraud by rendering services to corporation that committed fraud).
14. See Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1485 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding bank
could be held liable as aider and abettor of securities fraud); Woods v.Barnett Bank, 765 F.2d
1004, 1013 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding bank liable as aider and abettor); see aLso First Va.
Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1310 (5th Cir. 1977) (affirmingjudgment of liability for
denmid, 435 U.S. 952 (1978).
commercial lending institution), cert.
15. SeeHarveyL Pitt, TheDemireofImplidAlngandAbtingLiaHiy,N.Y. LJ., May 2,1994,
at 1 (claiming that aiding and abetting suits vwere brought against securities professionals
primarily for "size of insurance policy" rather than for such professionals' activities).
16. 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
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cause of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 was unavailable
to private plaintiffs.17 This decision continued the Court's recent
trend of strictly construing statutes and of limiting the scope of the
securities laws. Hailed by some and condemned by others,1 8 the
Supreme Court's decision in CentralBank has fundamentally altered
the means by which private investors can be compensated for an
injury and the means by which secondary participants in these frauds
can be held accountable. This Comment will explore these changes
and make recommendations for improving the current situation.
Part I of this Comment describes aiding and abetting liability before
CentralBank. It examines the development of private causes of action
under the securities laws, the development of aiding and abetting
liability under section 10(b), and the elements that make up this
cause of action. Part II discusses the Supreme Court's decision in
CentralBank, including a review of decisions preceding the case. Part
III concerns Central Bank's immediate and long term impact. In its

examination, Part III looks at aiding and abetting liability as both a
private cause of action and a deterrent, and also explores the effect
of Central Bank on alternative forms of secondary liability. Part IV
recommends that Congress legislatively overrule the decision in
CentralBank, and in so doing, reform private securities litigation with
respect to secondary liability.

I. BEFORE CENTRAL BANK: PRIVATE AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY
UNDER SECTION 10(B)

A.

Development of a Private Right of Action

In interpreting the federal securities laws, the courts originally
relied on tort law to imply private rights of action.19 In 1946, a
federal district court in Pennsylvania became the first court to

17. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
18. Paul M. Barrett,Justices Deal Investors a Blow in Certain Suits, WALL ST.J., Apr. 20, 1994,
atA2. Seen as a boon to accountants, lawyers, and financial service advisors who are "commonly

swept into securities-fraud suits even if their roles were tangential," the decision was condemned
by Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.), then-Chairman of the House Telecommunications and
Finance Subcommittee, as well as those who favored the rights of shareholders. Id.
19. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512,513 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (holding that,

based on principles of Restatement of Torts, person who violates legislative enactment is liable to
party that legislation was intended to protect); see also Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d
262 (7th Cir.) (using common law conspiracy theory in sale and control case to find liability
under § 10(b)), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307

F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962) (relying on common law concepts to find that peripheral defendant
could be liable under securities laws); Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of

the SecuritiesAct of 1934, 69 CAL L. Ray. 80, 80 (1981) (indicating that courts have relied upon
tort common law principles to imply private rights of action and impose secondary liability).
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recognize a private remedy under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co." The court based its finding of an
implied right of private action on the tort maxim of ubi jus ibi
remediu 2 --where there is a right, there is a remedy.'
Since the decision in Kardon, an implied private right of action
under section 10(b) has become largely accepted as part of the
federal securities laws. Though the Supreme Court has rejected
reliance on tort law to imply private rights of action, 2 3 now relying
instead on congressional intent, 24 the Court has continued to
recognize the existence of an implied private remedy under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.' Indeed, the Court has described such an
implied private remedy as "well established" 26 and "beyond peradventure."2 7 In fact, the Court has held that private actions are a
necessary supplement to SEC enforcement proceedings and, where

implied, are consistent with Congress' intent in adopting the 1934

Act. 29 Though the implied right of action found in Kardon concerned a primary violation of the securities laws, 0 after the Kardon

20. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
21. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D.Pa. 1946).
22. Brennan v. Midwestem United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 6S0 (N.D.Ind. 1956),
deniAr, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
afl, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
23. SeeTouche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560,568 (1979) (finding reliance on tort
law to imply private right of action to be entirely "misplaced" in case reversing amard of damages
against accounting firm for alleged breach of duty).
24. See i&.at 575 (finding that central question in determining whether private remedy
exists is "whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause
ofaction"); see asoTransamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Le~vis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979) (stating that
"dispositive question" is whether Congress intended to create private remedy).
25. See, eg., Superintendent v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971)
(stating that private right ofaction is implied under § 10(b) ofSecurities Exchange Act of1934);
se also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,280-31 (1988) (indicating thatjudidal decisions have
left little doubt that private cause of action exists for violations of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5);
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 n.10 (1983) (explaining that private
remedy for violations of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 has been recognized for over 35 years); Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976) (stting that pivate cause of action for § 10 (b)
and Rule lOb-5 violations is well established despite lack of express provision or dear
congressional intent).
26. Hochfelder,425 U.S. at 196.
27. Huddston, 459 U.S. at 380.
28. See Basic 485 U.S. at 231 (asserting that private cause of action under § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 is "essential tool for enforcement of the 1934 Act's requirements"); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975) (finding that private enforcement ofsecurities laws
provides necessary supplement to SEC action).
29. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977) (suggesting that private
actions are implied where they are necessary to ensure fulfillment of "fundamental purpose" of

1934 Act, which is philosophy of full and fair disclosure in securities transactions).
30. Kardon, 69 F. Supp. at 513 (involving suit to recover damages against corporation and
other codefendants for conspiring to fraudulently induce plaintiffs into selling their stock in tvo
corporations for less than its true market value).
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decision, courts eventually began to extend this implied private right
of action to cases involving secondary liability.8 1
B. Developent of Aiding and Abetting Liability
Neither section 10(b) of the 1934 Act nor Rule 10b-5 contain any
explicit basis for, or reference to, aiding and abetting liability in
private actions. 2 Instead, aiding and abetting liability in private
securities suits developed from tort law in a manner akin to the
original development of an implied private right of action under
section 10(b). 33 Courts initially found a basis for aiding and abetting
liability by relying on the Restatement of Torts section 876(b)34 and

31. See infra note 47 and accompanying text (summarizing development of right to actlon
under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 in federal circuit courts).
32. See William H. Kuehnle, Secondary Liability Under the FederalSecurities Laws-Aiding and
Abetting Conspiracy, ControllingPerson, and Agency: Common-Law Principsand the Statutory Scheme,
14J. CoRP. L 313, 321 (1989) (explaining that aiding and abetting liability is generally not
expressly provided for in federal securities laws); DonJ. McDermott,Jr., LiabilityforAiding and

Abetting Violations ofRule 10b-5: The Recklesness Standardin CivilDamage Actions, 62 TEX. L RV.
1087, 1091 n.24 (1984) (stating that though aiding and abetting is mentioned elsewhere In
federal securities statutes, aiding and abetting liability is not mentioned in § 10(b) or Rule 10b.
5).

Aiding and abetting is mentioned twice in the 1934 Act, in §§ 15 and 21. See 15 U.S.C. §
78o(b) (4) (E) (1988) (allowing SEC to limit activities of broker-dealers who have willfully aided
and abetted violations of securities laws); id. § 78u-2(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (permitting
civil penalties in administrative proceedings against any person aiding and abetting violations
of securities laws). Aiding and abetting is also mentioned twice in the Investment Company Act
of 1940. See id. § 80a-9(b) (3) (explaining that SEC may prevent any person from working for
investment company if that person was found to have willfully aided and abetted violations of
securities laws); id. § 80a-9(d) (1) (B) (permitting SEC to impose civil penalties in administrative
hearings against persons serving investment companies if they have willfully aided and abetted
violations of securities laws). Finally, aiding and abetting liability is mentioned four times In the
Investment Advisors Act of 1940. See id. § 80b-3(e) (5) (allowing SEC to limit activities of
investment advisors who have willfully aided and abetted violations of securities laws); id. § 80b3(e) (7) (C) (permitting SEC to limit activities of investment advisors who have been found by
foreign authorities to have aided and abetted violations of foreign securities laws); id. § 80b3(i)(1)(B) (permitting SEC to impose civil penalties in administrative hearings against
investment advisors if they have willfully aided and abetted violations of securities laws); id. §
80b-9(d) (allowing SEC to pursue injunctions in district court against investment advisors who
are aiding and abetting violations of securities laws); see also SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316
(6th Cir. 1974) (finding no other basis for secondary liability than "controlling persons"
provision of § 20 of 1934 Act), cert. deniA, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
33. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (citing cases showing reliance on Restatement
of Torts in developing implied private rights of action under federal securities laws).
34. Section 876(b) states:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one Is
subject to liability if he
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common design with
him, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial
assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other in accomplishing a
tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty
to the third person.
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other tort law principles.s
The first major case to rely on tort law in finding aiding and
abetting liability in securities fraud was Brennan v. Midwestern United
Life Insurance Co.3 6 Described as the most important and influential
securities case involving secondary liability to date, 7 Brennan embraced the principles laid out by the Restatement of Torts.' The case
involved a class action suit by stock purchasers who never received
delivery of their purchased stock. 9 They alleged that Midwestern
United Life Insurance Company was civilly liable under section 10(b)
for aiding and abetting the fraud of a broker, Dobich Securities.40
The plaintiffs claimed that Midwestern failed to report Dobich's
activities even though it was aware of Dobich's scheme, 41 and that by
permitting the scheme to continue, Midwestern benefited from the
artificial build-up of the market for its stock.2

The district court found that Midwestern could be civilly liable as
an aider and abettor of Dobich's violation of section 10(b). Using

section 876 of the Restatement of Torts as a foundation, the court in
Brennan held that implying aiding and abetting liability based on
common law tort principles was a "logical and natural complement"

RESTAT ENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 876 (1977).
35. See Coffey, 493 F.2d at 1316 (stating that courts have defined aiding and abetting liability
using RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 876 and 18 U.S.C. § 2 of criminal code); Landy v. FDIC, 486
F.2d 139,162 (3d Cir. 1973) (using RESrATaEMNT OF TORTS § 876 as basis for elements ofaiding
and abetting liability), cet deniAd 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins.
Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680 (N.D. Ind. 1966) (holding that aiding and abetting liability arises
from principles of Restatement of Torts, fulfills purposes of 1934 Act. and complements privte
right of action doctrine established in Kardon), aft'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert denied
397 U.S. 989 (1970).
36. 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966), afd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cat deni& 397
U.S. 989 (1970).
37. See F'schel, supra note 19, at 83 (describing Brennan as leading case on aiding and
abetting liability); David S. Ruder, Multiple Defendants in S cciti Law Fraud Cse Aiding and
Abeuing, onspiray, In Pan Ddicto, Indemnitiwn and Contributin 120 U. PA. L REv. 597, 620
(1972) (referring to Brennan as most important securities law case dealing with secondary
liability).
38. Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 680.
39. Id. at 675.
40. ML
41. Id
42. Brennan, 417 F.2d at 150-54. Dobich had created an artificially high market price for
Midwestem stock through abnormal selling activities involving a large amount of the total shares
sold of Midwestem stock. Id. at 153. In order to cover all of its short sales, Dobich used its
customers' money as working capital. Id. at 150. Dobich then concealed this scheme ry
delaying deliveries of Midwestern stock. Id. Customers complaining to Midwestem about late
deliveries were referred to Dobich. Id. at 152-53. When asked about these dela), Dobich
responded by lying about the reasons for the late deliveries. Id. at 152. When the scheme
finally collapsed, almost three million dollars worth of purchased Midwestem stock remained
undelivered. Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 675.
43. Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 675.
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to the implication of a private right of action under Rule 10b-5.

Fusing tort law into securities law, the district court found that a cause
of action did exist and refused to dismiss the complaint."
Since the Brennan decision in 1968 and its subsequent approval by
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in 1969,46 aiding and abetting
liability for securities fraud under section 10(b) has been acknowledged by every circuit court that has considered the issue. 47 Most

courts followed the tort law approach and adopted the same rationale
that was used in Brennan.4' Relying heavily on the Restatement of
Torts, these courts found that actors with knowledge of another's
fraud who rendered substantial assistance to the party committing the
fraud could be held liable as aiders and abettors.49 Other courts

44. Id at 680; see supra note 19 and accompanying text (explaining that private rights of
action under Rule 10b-5 were also developed from general principles of tort law).
45. Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 675.
46. Brennan, 417 F.2d at 155.
47. See Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 495 (4th Cir. 1991) (recognizing aiding and
abetting liability as cause of action under § 10(b) of 1934 Act), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 936 (1992);
Robin v. Arthur Young & Co., 915 F.2d 1120, 1123 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that circuit

recognizes cause of action for aiding and abetting violations of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5), cert.
denied 499 U.S. 923 (1991); Moore v. Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297, 303 (6th Cir.) (indicating that
one can be found liable as aider and abettor if "'some other party has committed a securities
law violation, if the accused party had general awareness that his role was part of an overall
activity that is improper, and if the accused aider-abettor knowingly and substantially assisted the
violation'" (quoting SEC v. Washington County, 676 F.2d 218, 224 (6th Cir. 1984))), cert. denied,
483 U.S. 1006 (1987); Woods v. Barnett Bank, 765 F.2d 1004,1009 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating that
circuit precedent had established elements required for aiding and abetting liability under §
10(b) and Rule 10b-5); Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir, 1983) (stating test
for aiding and abetting liability in securities fraud is well-settled in First Circuit); Harmsen v.
Smith, 693 F.2d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 1982) (listing elements of aiding and abetting liability under
§ 10(b) as: "(1) the existence of an independent primary wrong; (2) actual knowledge by the
alleged aider and abettor of the wrong and of his or her role in furthering it; and (3) substantial
assistance in the wrong"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822 (1983); Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 782
(8th Cir. 1981) (indicating that circuit court has developed three-part test for imposing aiding
and abetting liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5); IIT v.Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir.
1980) (listing three prerequisites necessary for aiding and abetting liability); Moasen v.
Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799 (3d Cir.) (finding aiding and abetting when
plaintiff establishes: "(1) that there has been a commission of a wrongful act-an underlying
securities violation; (2) that the alleged aider-abettor had knowledge of that act; and (3) that
the aider-abettor knowingly and substantially participated in the wrong doing"), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 930 (1978); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975) (stating that for
aiding and abetting liability under Rule 10b-5 to be established, "another party must have
violated the securities laws, the alleged aider-abettor must be generally aware of his role In
improper activity, and he must knowingly render substantial assistance"); Zabriskie v.Lewis, 507
F.2d 546, 553 (10th Cir. 1974) (finding aiding and abetting violation of§ 10(b) is sufficient for
imposition of liability); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304,1316 (6th Cir. 1974) (finding that one may
be held liable as aider and abettor if three elements are met), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
48. See infranote 56 (citing cases adopting aiding and abetting liability elements based on
tort principles); see also Mary T. Doherty, Note, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud, 25 IND. L.

REV. 829, 835 (1992) (explaining that tort law approach to § 10(b) aiding and abetting liability
is majority approach among circuits).
49. See supranote 35 (citing cases relying on Restatement of Torts); infra note 56 (listing cases
adopting elements of aiding and abetting liability based on Restatement of Torts).
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applied criminal law principles to achieve essentially the same
result.50 Under this approach, the courts focus on the actor's intent
to participate in and further the fraud of another.51 Finally, some
courts combine both criminal and tort law principles to support
aiding and abetting liability in securities fraud.52
C. Elements of Aiding and Abetting Liabil'ty

First articulated by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Landy v.
FDIC,53 the three generally recognized elements of aiding and
abetting liability in securities fraud are: (1) existence of a securities
law violation by a primary party;, (2) knowledge of the violation by the
aider and abettor; and (3) substantial assistance by the aider and
abettor in the achievement of the primary violation.m This formulation of the elements of aiding and abetting liability closely resembles
i
and has been adopted by
section 876(b) of the Restatement of Tortw

50. See Coffey, 493 F.2d at 1315 (stating that courts have relied on both Resta/ttent of Torts

and 18 U.S.C. § 2 of criminal code when developing aiding and abetting liability); se also 18
U.S.C. §2(a) (1988) (stating that whoever"aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures
(the] commission [of an offense], is punishable as a principal").
Additionally, many courts have cited the definition for aiding and abetting liability in the
criminal context as set forth by the Supreme Court in Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S.
613, 619-20 (1949). SeeZoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27,35-36 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(endorsing principle delineated by A2e & Assen that in order to aid and abet, one must be
involved with venture, has reason for participating in venture, and seeks bry his action to make
venture succeed); Woodzard, 522 F.2d at 95 n.23 (comparing Ae & N .mndefinition of aiding
and abetting liability, that one needs to be involved or associated with enterprise in order to aid
and abet, with Restatement of Toris which states that in order to aid and abet, one must have
knowledge of breach and render substantial assistance); Landyv. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139,163-64 (3d
Cir. 1973) (examining A5e & Nssen definition that one must associate himself ,ith actvities
involved in order to aid and abet, as it applied to aiding and abetting liability in criminal
context), cert. denied, 416 US. 960 (1974). QuotingJudge Learned Hand, the Supreme Court
stated in A'e & Nisse
In order to aid and abet another to commit a crime it is necessaxy that a defendant in
some sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in something
that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed."
A'e & Ntssen, 336 U.S. at 619 (quoting United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401,402 (2d Cir. 1938)
(opinion of Hand, J.)).
51. See M5e & Nu-sen, 336 US. at 619 (stating that defendant must participate or further
success of venture in order to impose aiding and abetting liability).
52. See IT v. Comfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980) (using criminal law concepts to
describe aidingand abetting liability, but determining defendant's actual liabilityforaidingand
abetting securities fraud using tort law model); Coffey, 493 F.2d at 1315 (stating that courts have
relied on both Restatement of Torts and 18 U.S.C. § 2 of criminal code when developing aiding
and abetting liability).
53. 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cer. deni" 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
54. See landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding elements for liability
under aiding and abetting theory to be: "(1) that an independent wrong exist; (2) that the
aider or abettor know of that wrong's existence; and (3) that substantial assistance be given in
effecting that wrong"), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
55. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (citing Restatment of Torts and cases
demonstrating aiding and abetting liabilities basis in tort law).
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virtually every circuit court, with some variation from circuit to
circuit.-s
The first element, the existence of a primary violation of the
securities laws,57 has not been a problematic issue in suits alleging
aiding and abetting liability. In fact, there is very little discussion of
this element in any case law.5 8 Despite variations among the circuits

in the exact language used to describe the first element, any primary
59
violation of the securities laws has generally satisfied its scope.
The second and third elements, knowledge and substantial

56. See Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982, 986 (10th Cir. 1992)
(requiring that "fraud in the sale of securities by the primary violator, knowledge of that fraud,"
and "'substantial assistance'" be shown to establish aiding and abetting liability (quoting Barker
v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 496 (7th Cir. 1986))); K & S Partnership
v. Continental Bank, 952 F.2d 971, 977 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that three-part test for aiding
and abetting liability requires "existence of a securities law violation by the primary party ....
'knowledge' of the violation" by aider-abettor, and "'substantial assistance'" in achieving primary
violation (quoting FDKv. First Interstate Bank, 885 F.2d 423, 429 (8th Cir. 1989))), aert, dcnied
112 S. Ct. 2993 (1992); Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1991)
(indicating that aiding and abetting claim must show "existence of an independent primary
wrong .... actual knowledge or reckless disregard" of wrong and of role in it, and "substantial
assistance" in furthering wrong); Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 495 (4th Cir. 1991)
(requiring "primary violation by another person, ... alder and abettor's 'knowledge' of the
primary violation," and "substantial assistance" for aiding and abetting liability); Fine v. American
Solar King Corp., 919 F.2d 290, 300 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that to establish aiding and
abetting liability, plaintiff must prove "securities violation by a primary party. ... alder and
abettor had a general awareness of its role in the violation,... [and that the] alder and abettor
knowingly rendered substantial assistance"); Moore v. Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297, 303 (6th Cir.
1987) (finding aiding and abetting liability when "'some other party has committed a securities
law violation, if the accused party had general awareness that his role was part of an overall
activity that is improper, and if the accused aider-abettor knowingly and substantially assisted the
violation'" (quoting SEC v. Washington County, 676 F.2d 218, 224 (6th Cir. 1982))); Cleary v.
Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding that plaintiff must show primary
violation, alder and abettor vras generally aware of violation and plaintiff's role in it, and alder
and abettor knowingly and substantially assisted to establish liability); lIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d
909,922 (2d Cir. 1980) (listing requirements for aiding and abetting liability as primary violation
of securities laws, knowledge of violation by aider and abettor, and substantial assistance);
Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799 (3d Cir.) (finding aiding and
abetting when plaintiff establishes "(1) that there has been a commission of a wrongful act-an
underlying securities violation; (2) that the alleged aider-abettor had knowledge of that act; and
(3) that the aider-abettor knowingly and substantially participated in the wrong doing"), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978).
57. See supranote 54 and accompanying text (indicating that first element of aiding and
abetting liability is primary violation of securities laws); see also Alan R. Bromberg & Lewis D.
Lowenfels, Aiding and AbettingSecritiesFraud:A CriticalExamination,52 ALx. L. REv. 637, 668-69
(1988) (stating that first element of aiding and abetting liability is existence of securities law
violation by another). A primary violation of the federal securities law can include, for example,
any "misrepresentation, omission, scheme to defraud, or fraudulent course of business, or any
of the more specific acts included within the general terms, such as manipulation or churning."
Id. at 670.
58. See Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 57, at 669; Kuehnle, supra note 32, at 322.
59. See Bromberg & Lowenfels, supranote 57, at 669-70 (indicating that any independent,
illegal act can satisfy first element); see also Elizabeth Sager, Comment, The Recognition ofAiding
andAbettinginthe FederalSecuritiesLaws, 23 Hous. L. REV. 821,829 (1986) (stating that generally
.any securities law violation" satisfies first element of aiding and abetting liability).
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assistance, have proven to be more difficult to define. 60 Over the
years, several tests, with varying standards for knowledge and

assistance, were developed in the different circuits.6 One such
formulation, often referred to as the majority view, requires that the
alleged aider and abettor have knowledge of the primary violation
and that the aider and abettor perform acts that substantially assisted
the violation.6 2 A variation of the majority test uses a slightly higher
standard for both knowledge and assistance, requiring the aider and
abettor to have a "general awareness" of his role in an improper
activity and to have knowingly and substantially assisted in the
violation.'
A third test, developed by the Seventh Circuit, has

60. See 17T, 619 F.2d at 922 ("Although the list of prerequisites has become commonplace,
the exact content of the rather vague phrases, especially 'knowledge' and 'substantial assistance,'
is still being delineated by the courts."); swealsoSager, supra note 59, at 829 (finding that courts
have yet to agree on parameters of knowledge and assistance).
61. See Doherty, supranote 48, at 84041 (dividing different aiding and abetting tests into
three basic formulations: majority rule, "general awareness" test, and Seventh Circuit test).
62. This test is used in the Second, Third, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits. &eDBLKM, Inc. v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 969 F.2d 905,908 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that elements for aiding and
abetting liability are primary violation, knowledge of primary violation, and substantial
assistance); Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 782-83 (8th Cir. 1981) (requiring primary %iolation,
knowledge of violation, and substantial assistance as prerequisites for aiding and abetting
liability); Rolf v. Byth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47-48 (2d Cir.) (finding aiding and
abetting liability requires primary violation, knowledge of violation, and substantial assistance
in achieving violation), cer. dend, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 162-63
(3d Cir. 1973) (requiring knowledge of existingwrongandsubstantial assistance in effecting that
wrong), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); se also National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Turtur, 892 F.2d
199,206-07 (2d Cir. 1989) (requiring primary securities violation, scienter byalderand abettor,
and substantial assistance by alder and abettor); Walck v. American Stock Exch., 687 F.2d 778,
791 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that elements for aiding and abetting liability are independent
wrong, knowledge of wrong, and substantial assistance in furthering wrong), at dznd, 461 U.S.
942 (1983).
The Ninth Circuit's test is also similar. So Harmsen v. Smith, 693 F.2d 932, 943 (9th Cir.
1982) (requiring existence of independent wrong, actual knowledge by aider and abettor of
wrong and of role in furthering wrong, and substantial assistance in wrong), ceM denid,464 U.S.
822 (1983).
63. This version of the aiding and abetting test is used by the Frst Fifth, Sixth, and
Eleventh Circuits. Sea Fine v. American Solar King Corp., 919 F.2d 290, 300 (5th Cir. 1990)
(stating that in order to have primary securities violation, "general awareness" by aider and
abettor of role and "knowingly rendered" substantial assistance is required). cert grantedsubn=n.
Hurdman v. Fine, 501 U.S 1229, cert. dimissa, 502 U.S. 976 (1991); Moore v. Fenex. Inc., 809
F.2d 297,303 (6th Cir.) (requiring primary violation, general amareness of role in violation, and
knowing and substantial assistance), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987); Woods v. Barnett Bank,
765 F.2d 1004, 1009 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating that aiding and abetting liability under § 10(b)
attaches "if some other party has committed a securities law violation, if the accused (had]
general awareness that his role was part of an over all activity that (was] improper, and if (he]
knowingly and substantially assisted the violation"); Clearyv. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 777
(1st Cir. 1983) (finding that for aiding and abetting liability, plaintiff must show primary
violation, that aider and abettor was generally aware ofviolation and his role, and that aiderand
abettor knowingly and substantially assisted); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 94-97 (5th
Cir. 1975) (stating that for aiding and abetting liability under Rule 10b-5 to be established,
"another party must have violated the securities lavs, the alleged aider-abettor must be generally
aware of his role in improper activity, and he must knowingly render substantial assistance");
SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974) (finding aiding and abetting liability when
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proven to be the most stringent by requiring a manipulative or
deceptive act proscribed by section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 to have been
committed
with the same degree of scienter required for primary
64

liability-.

Of the three elements of aiding and abetting liability, knowledge or
scienter is the most important.' Following the Supreme Court's
decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,6 proof of scienter was
required to maintain a cause of action under Rule 1Ob-5.67 Since the
decision in Hochfelder, all of the lower courts deciding aiding and
abetting claims have found the knowledge element and the scienter
requirement to be essentially identical.' What standard satisfies
knowledge or scienter, however, remains unsettled. 9

primary violation by other party, general awareness of violation and of role in violation by alder
denied, 420 U.S.
and abettor, and aider and abettor's knowing and substantial assistance), cert.
908 (1975).
The D.C. Circuit's test for aiding and abetting liability is similar, though it has not been
specifically applied in § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 securities fraud cases. SeeSEC v. Falstaff Brewing
Corp., 629 F.2d 62, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating that "(t]o hold that a defendant aided and
abetted another's violation, a court must conclude that a wrongful act occurred, that the
defendant was aware of it, and that he knowingly and substantially participated in it").
64. See Robin v. Arthur Young & Co., 915 F.2d 1120, 1123 (7th Cir. 1990) (requiring that
aider and abettor act with equivalent degree ofscienter as primary liability requires), cert. denied,
499 U.S. 923 (1991); Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490,495 (7th Cir.
1986) (interpreting Hochfelder and Huddlestonto require aiders and abettors to have same mental
state required for primary liability); see also Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S.Ct. 1439,
1444 (1994) (stating that Seventh Circuit test foreclosed liability for aiders and abettors).
65. See Woodward, 522 F.2d at 97 (recognizing that without requirement of knowledge,
numerous people would face liability for some role in facilitating fraud in cases of ordinary and
honest actions).
66. 425 U.S. 185,193 (1976) (holding that private cause of action will not lie under § 10(b)
or Rule 1Ob-5 in absence of scienter).
67. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976). The Court defined
"scienter" as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud." Id.
68. See Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir.) (noting that "basic
holding of Hochfelder, that scienter is an element of the Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 cause of
action, also establishes the standard for aiding and abetting liability"), cert. denied,439 U.S. 1039
(1978); see also Metge v. Bachlee, 762 F.2d 621, 624 (8th Cir. 1985) (discussing what evidence
must be shown to meet requisite "knowledge or scienter"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986):
Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 783 (8th Cir. 1981) (discussing what degree of knowledge
requirement will meet scienter requirement); lIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922-24 (2d Cir.
1980) (referring to knowledge requirement as scienter requirement).
69. See Hochfedder, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12 (reserving decision on question of whether in some
circumstances reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b)).
The issue of whether recklessness satisfied the knowledge/scienter requirement was the
question originally petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court in the CentralBank case. See
High CourtAgrees To ConsiderAidingandAbetting Questions,Sec. L. Daily (BNA) 1, 1 Uune 8, 1993)
(indicating that parties believed that availability of aiding and abetting liability was settled and

that issue requested for certiorari was scope). In fact, the SEC had requested that the Supreme
Court grant certiorari in order to resolve the recklessness issue. Id
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Some courts have held that proof of recklessness is sufficient to
establish scienter, ° while others have insisted on the more stringent
requirement of actual knowledge.7 1 Recklessness usually satisfied the
scienter requirement in an aiding and abetting case when the alleged
aider and abettor owed an independent duty of disclosure to the

defrauded party.72 Absent an independent duty to disclose, however,
these courts would not apply the recklessness standard, and instead,
would apply an actual knowledge standard.'h Other courts ignored
this distinction and held that the recklessness standard satisfied the
scienter requirement even in the absence of a duty to disclose.74
Though aiding and abetting liability under section 10(b) had been
accepted and extensively used by the lower courts for over tventy-five
years, the Supreme Court never directly addressed the actual
availability of aiding and abetting liability until the Central Bank

70. See HT,619 F.2d at 923 (finding recklessness generally satisfies scienter requirement);
Ro, 570 F.2d at 44 (concluding that where aider and abetter owes fiduciary duty, recklessness
satisfies scienter requirement).
71. See Melge 762 F.2d at 625 (requiring higher standard of intent in cases where aider and
abetter has no duty to act or disclose); HT, 619 F.2d at 925 (finding that scienter requirement
becomes more stringent where no fiduciary duty is owed).
72. SeeRobin v. Arthur Young& Co., 915 F.2d 1120,1126 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding reckless
denhd 499 US. 923 (1991);
conduct sufficient to satisfy wrongful intent requirement), cert.
Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 1982) ("There is some indication
in this Circuit... that an aider and abettors liability can be predicated on recklessness only
where the defendant owed a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff."); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d
84,97 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding liability possible with degree ofscienter less than high conscious
intent when duty of disclosure is involved).
73. See Ross v. Bolton, 904 F.2d 819, 824 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that where no fiduciary
duty is owed, plaintiff must show defendant acted with actual intent to defraud); Edvmrds &
Hanly v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478, 485 (2d Cir.) (finding that showing
of actual intent to defraud is necessary in absence offiduciary relationship), eat. dm'td,444 U.S.
1045 (1979); Kahn v. Chase Manhattan Bank, NA., 760 F. Supp. 369, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(stating that when alleged aider and abettor owes no fiduciary duty to plaintiff, Imowledge
requirement is not satisfied by recklessness but rather "scales upwardf); = aLo Bromberg &
Lowenfels, supra note 57, at 671 (stating that when there is no duty, knowledge requirement is
said to "scale upward," thereby elevating to more stringent standard of full scienter with intent
to defraud, rather than recklessness).
74. See Herm v. Stafford, 663 F.2d 669, 684 (6th Cir. 1981) (noting that recklessns is

"sufficient" to satisfy knowledge requirement in case involving aiding and abetting liability);

Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1024 n.22 (6th Cr. 1979) (finding no
reason to limit adoption of recklessness standard to defendant's owing fiduciary duty to
plaintiff); see alsoAndreo v. Friedlander, Gaines, Cohen, Rosenthal & Rosenberg, 660 F. Supp.
1362, 1367-68 (D. Conn. 1987) (finding that fiduciary duty is not required for application of
recklessness standard to satisfy knowledge element of aiding and abetting liability and holding
that complaint alleging law firm's reckless disregard for truth, rather than actual knowledge, is
sufficient); Resnick v. Touche Ross & Co., 470 F. Supp. 1020, 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (indicating
that knowledge or scienter requirement is satisfied by recklessness).
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case.7' In fact, when faced with the question on two previous
76
occasions, the Supreme Court reserved judgement on the issue.
CENTRAL BAN- THE ELIMINATION OF AIDING AND ABETTING
LIABILrTY UNDER SECTION 10(B)

II.

A.

The Road to Central Bank: The GradualNarrowing of the
Securities Laws

Despite an initial period of expansion, 77 the Supreme Court began
to narrow the scope of federal securities laws in a series of cases
beginning in 1975.78 Starting with Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 79 the Court began to place a greater emphasis on statutory
language restricting the reach of section 10(b) and Rule 101>5 by
denying new implied private actions and restricting older implied
private actions.8" This trend, a result of the Court's concern over
the expansion of securities liability and its desire to curb vexatious
litigation,"' set the stage for the Court's decision in CentralBank.82
75. See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1443 (1994) (acknowledging
reservation of deciding issue of aiding and abetting in two earlier cases, Huddeton and
Hodzfekler).
76. SeeHerman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,379 n.5 (1983) (noting that Court
has reserved decision on issue of availability of aiding and abetting liability); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 191 n.7 (1976) (noting that Court need not consider whether civil
liability for aiding and abetting is appropriate in light of Court's holding that intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud is required for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule 101>5).
77. See Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 57, at 648 n.63 (stating that Supreme Court
broadly construed § 10(b), Rule 101>5, and securities laws generally, and lower courts repeatedly
recognized private rights of action under them during "Expansion Era," which ended in 1974).
78. See Bromberg &Lowenfels, supranote 57, at 648 n.64 (stating that during "Contraction
Era," beginning around 1975, Supreme Court refused to recognize new implied rights of action,
restricted old implied rights of action, criticized all implied rights of action, and cut back on
SEC's enforcement powers); see also Benoay v. Decker, 517 F. Supp. 490, 495 (E.D. Mich. 1981)
(holding that Supreme Court's decision in Hochfeerrequiring scienter to state § 10(b) claim
is indication that aiding and abetting liability will not exist apart from liability for direct
violation).
79. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
80. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730-31 (1975) (holding that

only person who purchases or sells securities in fraudulent transaction has standing to sue tinder

Rule 101>5); see also Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,477 (1977) (holding that Rule 10b-5
is limited to situations involving actual deception, and thus, transactions that are unfair, but
where material facts are adequately disclosed, cannot be attacked under Rule 101>5); Hochfcdder,
425 U.S. at 193 n.12 (holding that private plaintiff must allege and prove "scienter," which Is
.mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud"); Roberta S. Harmel,
Impticalions of the 'CentralBank of Denver' Case, N.Y. LJ., June 16, 1994, at 3 (indicating that
restrictive interpretation ofRule 101>5 began with Blue Chip). But seeHuddlton,459 U.S. at 387
(holding that availability of express remedy under Securities Act of 1933 does not preclude
defrauded purchasers of stock from maintaining action under Rule 101>5).
81. See Bromberg & Lowenfels, supranote 57, at 648 n.64 (stating that Supreme Court was
concerned over expansion of securities liability and was determined to keep it in check): see also
Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 739-40 (recognizing that unduly expansive impositions of liability under
federal securities laws will lead not only to vexatious litigation, but also to largerjudgments, that
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Blue Chip was a case in which the Court restrictively interpreted

Rule 10b5.P In this case, the Court limited the field of potential
plaintiffs in a Rule 10b-5 suit by holding that a plaintiff had to be
either a purchaser or a seller of securities.' Relying on statutory
language, the Court found that section 10(b) only prohibited
manipulative or deceptive acts "in connection with the [actual]

purchase or sale of any security,"8 not any attempt to sell or
purchase a security 6 The Court based its restrictive reading of the
1934 Act on both congressional intent and public policy grounds,
noting that securities litigation had a propensity to be vexatious.'

This restrictive trend continued in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfeder,s
where the Supreme Court held that scienter was a required element
of a Rule lOb-5 suit. 9 The Court stated that the words in the
statute, "manipulative," "device," and "contrivance," showed a clear
congressional intent that negligence was not a sufficient threshold.'

Hochfelder-weakened the third clause of Rule 10b-5, which on its face
seems to prohibit "any act" that is fraudulent. 9' Instead, the Court
eliminated the clause's coverage of fraudulent conduct not committed
with scienter or specific intent to deceive, again limiting the conduct
.2
actionable under Rule 10b-5
Additionally, in Santa Fe Industries v. Green,93 the Court held that

breaches of fiduciary duty by corporate directors were covered by state

will be paid "in the last analysis" by innocent investors).
82. See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1446 (1994) (stating that
Court has always refused to allow Rule 10b-5 challenges to conduct not prohibited by text of
statute).
83. See armel, supra note 80, at 3 (explaining that Blue Chipis first Supreme Court case to
interpret Rule 10b-5 restrictively rather than liberally).
84. See Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 730-36 (discussingjustiications for restricting plaintifrs cla
under § 10(b)).
85. See Ud at 732 (explainingSEC's failed attempts to change statutorylanguage of§ 10(b)).
86. See id. at 756 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that statute is starting point for case
involving statutory construction); see also Fischel, supra note 19, at 95 (stating that prohibited

conduct had to be connected with actual, not attempted, purchase or sale of any security).
87. See Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 739 (noting widespread recognition of danger posed t/
vexatious litigation under securities laws, which is different in degrees and kind from general
litigation, which may result from expansive interpretation of federal securities laws).
88. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
89. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976) (addressing issue raised by
customers of brokerage firm who invested in securities scheme that ultimately was revealed as
fraudulent).
90. Id at 199; seFischel, supranote 19, at 9596 (explaining that Court in Heehfdderfound
implying negligence would be adding gloss to statute not intended by Congress).
91. See supra note 2 (describing third clause of Rule 101>5).
92. See Hochfdder, 425 U.S. at 193 (holding that scienter is required in order to institute
private cause of action under § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5); Rarmel, supra note 80, at 3 (explaining
that Hochfdder limited scope of third clause of Rule 10b-5 to acts committed with scienter).
93. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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corporation law, not federal securities law, and, therefore, were not
actionable under Rule 10b-5. 4 According to the Court, the purpose
of the federal securities laws was to prevent deception and manipulation in the securities markets, and not to regulate corporate fiduciary
breaches." The Court stated that "[t]he language of § 10(b) gives
no indication that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct not
involving manipulation or deception.""6
The last time the Court directly dealt with secondary liability under
the federal securities laws before the decision in CentralBank was in
Pinter v. DahlY7 In Pinter, the Court again limited the scope of the
securities laws, this time by narrowing the reach of section 12 "seller"
liability.98 The Court held that only a "seller" of securities could be
liable for the sale of an unregistered security and simultaneously
applied a narrow construction to the term "seller."9 In order to
determine congressional intent, the Court relied upon the statute's
language."° This analysis suggested that the Court would look
closely at statutory language when determining the range of those
liable.101

In addition, the Supreme Court also began to question the use of
tort law principles to imply private rights of action under the
securities laws, suggesting that such reliance was "misplaced." 02
Instead, the Court stated that the existence of a private right of action
must be based on statutory construction and an analysis of congressional intent." Though not addressed directly, the Court's emphasis

94. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478-79 (1977) (addressing situation where
minority shareholders brought action against majority shareholders who had entered into

transaction to eliminate minority interest); see also Karmel, supra note 80, at 3 (stating that in
Santa Fe, Court found state corporation law covered breaches of fiduciary duty by corporate
directors and federal securities law covered deception and fraud in stock market).
95. Santa Fe 430 U.S. at 478-79.
96. i.at 473.
97. 486 U.S. 622 (1988). Pinterinvolved an action brought by investors in oil and gas leases
against the seller for violation of federal securities laws. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 622
(1988).
98. Id. at 641-55. The Court held that persons cannot be liable as "sellers" under § 12(1)

of the Securities Act of 1933 unless they either pass title to a security or solicit a sale of the
security with a requisite financial motive. Id. at 647.
99. See id at 650 (refusing to extend § 12(1) liability beyond express language of statute);

see also supra note 98.
100. See Pinter,486 U.S. at 650 (concluding that absence of express liability in § 12 indicated
that Congress did not intend to impose § 12 liability on "participants" collateral to offer or sale),
101. See id.
at 652-53 (stating that while Court has construed federal securities laws flexibly
to advance their remedial purposes, Court has placed primary emphasis on statute's language
and on assumption that "Congress meant what it said" when ascertaining scope of liability).
102. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979) (rejecting argument
implying private right of action under § 17(a) of 1934 Act, which was based upon tort law
principles, as "entirely misplaced").
103. Id
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on statutory construction also called into question reliance on
criminal law concepts to imply private rights of action.'
This trend of strictly construing the federal securities laws and the

labeling of tort and criminal law as a "misplaced" basis for implied
to
private actions caused some commentators05 and courts'
question the continued viability of aiding and abetting liability under
section 10(b) and Rule 101>5. As a result of this trend, the question

as a private right
of whether aiding and abetting liability was available
07
review.'
for
ripe
was
10(b)
of action under section
B. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver
In a landmark 5-4 decision," a divided Supreme Court continued
the trend of strictly construing the securities laws"° that began
almost twenty years earlier in Blue Chip."' In Central Bank of Denver

v. FirstInterstate Bank of Denver, the Court held there was no private
remedy for aiding and abetting a violation of section 10(b) of the
1934 Act."

The facts in CentralBank involved disputes arising from

depreciating real estate used to secure a series of Colorado development bonds."' In 1986 and 1988, the Colorado Springs-Stetson
Hills Public Building Authority (Authority) issued bonds totaling
twenty-six billion dollars to finance public improvements to a planned

104. See Fischel, supranote 19, at 93 n.81 (stating that common law doctrines can be relied
upon to determine conduct prohibited under statute).
105. SeeBromberg &Lowenfels, supranote 57, at 639-61 (discussing uncertainty surrounding
validity ofaiding and abetting liability as implied private action); Doherty, supranote 48, at 83637 (questioning whether aiding and abetting liability was still available following Supreme
Court's trend of narrowing securities laws); Fschel, supranote 19, at 93-94 (questioning whether
tort law principles form viable basis for imposing secondary liability in light of Supreme Court's
shift from tort law to congressional intent in implying private rights of action).
106. See Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 800

F.2d 177,183 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that"there is some ambiguity about the existence ofa chil

cause of action for aidingand abettingasection 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 violation"); Little v.Valley
Nat'l Bank, 650 F.2d 218, 220 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981) (expressing doubt as to basis of aiding and
abetting liability); Seattle-FstNat'l Bankv. Carlstedt, 101 F.RD. 715,722-23 (W.D. Okla. 1984)
( Tbe notion that aiding and abetting securities fraud constitutes ajusticiable violation of law
is itself a questionable assertion."), nev'd, 800 F.2d 1008 (10th Cir. 1986); Benoay v. Decker, 517
F. Supp. 490, 495 (E.D. Mich. 1981) ("It is... doubtful that a claim for 'aiding and abetting'
... will continue to exist under 10(b)."), affd mem., 735 F.2d 1363 (6th Cir. 1984).
107. See Doherty, supra note 48, at 837.
108. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1442 (1994). Justice Blackmun's
recent retirement from the Court and replacement by Justice Breyer should not affect the
balance of the Court in this decision because Justice Blackmun voted ith the disset. &e i
at 1455 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by BlackmunJ.).
109. See iU at 1444 (referring to Santa Fe and Hochfdder as indication of Court's strict
constructionist approach).
110. SeBlue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Sales, 421 US. 723, 731-32 (1975) (limiting class
ofplaintiffs who may bring Rule lOb-5 suit by vay of strict statutory construction of Rule lOb5).
111. CentralBank, 114 S. Ct. at 1455.
112. Id at 1443.
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Bank of
community in Colorado Springs."' The petitioner, Central
11 4
issues.
bond
two
the
for
trustee
Denver, was the indenture
The bond covenants required that the bonds be secured by land
appraised at values of at least 160% of the outstanding principal and
interest." 5 AmWest, the developer of the planned community,
provided Central Bank with two appraisals, one in 1986 and one in
1988.116 Despite significant declines in the local real estate market,
the second appraisal, conducted prior to the second bond offering,
indicated that land values securing the initial bonds had remained
essentially the same since 1986.117 The lead underwriter conveyed
concerns that the 160% test was not being satisfied." Central Bank
referred the 1988 appraisal to its in-house appraiser who then
suggested that an independent review of the new appraisal be
conducted." 9 After communicating with AmWest, however, Central
Bank decided to delay the review until after the second bond offering
closed in June 1988.12° Before the independent review could be
" '
First
completed, the Authority defaulted on the 1988 bonds.12
Interstate, which had purchased $2.1 million of the second issue
bonds, sued alleging the offering was part of a fraudulent scheme,
The district court granted
aided and abetted by Central Bank."
z but the Tenth Circuit Court
Central Bank summary judgement,"
of Appeals reversed, holding that even if an alleged aider and abettor
owes no duty to plaintiffs, if that person affirmatively assists a primary
violation, liability exists and proof of recklessness is sufficient to
sustain it. 24 The parties assumed aiding and abetting liability
existed, but disputed its scope."l On its own initiative, however, the
Supreme Court asked the parties to address whether aiding and
abetting liability was even available, an issue on which the Court had
reserved judgment for over eighteen years.126

113. lML
114. Id
115. Md
116. Id.
117. I.
118. I/.
119. IX.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. I1.
124. Id. at 1443-44.
125. Id. at 1457 (Stevens, J., dissenting); sm Pitt, supra note 15, at 1 (stating that parties In
CentralBank assumed existence of aiding and abetting liability in light of 25 years of precedent

but disputed scope).
126. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.7 (1976) (deciding to reserve
judgment on issue ofwhether aiding and abetting liability is valid private action); se alsoThomas
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In an opinion written by Justice Kennedy and joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas,'1 the
Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit, holding that a private
right of action for aiding and abetting liability may not be implied
under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.'
Strictly adhering to the
statutory text, the Court held that the language of section 10(b) did
not proscribe providing aid to a person who commits a manipulative
or deceptive act in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security."
Further, the Court rejected the SEC's argument as
amicus curiae that the phrase "directly or indirectly" used in the text
of the statute covered aiding and abetting.'s The Court found that
the reach of aiding and abetting liability encompassed more than just
those who may have indirectly engaged in a fraudulent activity and
therefore exceeded the scope of the "directly or indirectly" language."' The Court stated that section 10(b) only prohibits
the making of a material misstatement or omission or the commission
of a manipulative act, not the giving of aid to those that do."

The Court's strict construction of the statute was coupled with the
policy argument that securities litigation under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness over and above that of
other litigation." Suggesting that securities litigation had reached
excessive proportions, the Court rejected the SEC's argument that
aiding and abetting liability should be retained on policy grounds.',,
The SEC argued that such liability deterred secondary actors from
contributing to fraudulent activities and enhanced the likelihood that
defrauded parties would be made whole.11 Declining to accept this
argument, the Court commented on competing policy arguments
such as the vexatious nature of such lawsuits and how minor
participants in frauds are often forced to settle for large sums of
money in order to avoid uncertain jury trials. ' "

L Riesenberg, Supreme Court ToExamineAidingandAbeuingLi4alityUnderRue lOb-5, 7 ISMSCtrs
(P-H) No. 8, at 34 (1993) (explaining that in granting certiorari, Supreme Court decided to
examine not only knowledge issue, butalso to review issue ofaidingand abetting liability, which
was not addressed by lower courts).
127. CentralBank, 114 S. Ct. at 1442.
128. Id at 1455.
129. Id at 1446-47.
130. It. at 1447-48.
131. Id at 1447.
132. AL at 1448.
133. 1&at 1454 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 721 U.S. 723,739 (1975)).
134. Id. at 1453-54.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1454. See gerallyStephan D. Susman, A Case ForaCz.F-, TEX. lAW., Mray23,
1994, at 18 (commenting on frivolous and blackmail nature of securities la.suits).

1836

THE AMERiCAN UNIrsnY LAW REviEw [Vol. 44:1817

The Court also noted that the rejection of a private aiding and

137
abetting cause of action was consistent with congressional intent.

Based on the absence of aiding and abetting liability in any of the
express causes of action found elsewhere in the securities laws, the
Court stated that it would have been highly unlikely that Congress
would have included aiding and abetting liability in section 10(b). 1 s
Additionally, while Congress specifically addressed secondary liability
in the 1934 Act by imposing liability on "controlling persons," it chose
not to impose the broader secondary liability of aiding and abet9
13

ting.

The Supreme Court also rejected the SEC's suggestion that a
private cause of action for aiding and abetting liability under section
10(b) could be based on 18 U.S.C. § 2, a general aiding and abetting
statute applicable to all federal criminal offenses. 140 Such an
approach, the Court said, would imply private civil damage causes of
action for every criminal statute passed for the benefit of some
particular class of people. 41 The Court, therefore, rejected the
argument as having far reaching consequences with "no logical
stopping point.""
The dissent, written by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices
Blackmun, Souter, and Ginsburg, accused the majority of giving "short
shrift to a long history"" of section 10(b) aiding and abetting
liability."' Conceding that the 1934 Act did not expressly mention
aiding and abetting liability and that Congress knows how to legislate
when it wants to, the dissent nevertheless argued that there was no
reason to eliminate a private right of action recognized by all the
federal circuit courts. 15 According to the dissent, the Court was not
writing on a clean slate and "settled construction of an important
federal statute should not be disturbed unless and until Congress so
decides.""
The dissent pointed out that Congress chose not to
touch the "sizable body of law approving aiding and abetting liability
137. See CentralBank. 114 S.Ct. at 1448 (noting that statute itself resolves issue before Court
and even if it did not, Court could look to congressional intent where same conclusion would
be reached because if 73d Congress wanted to enact private cause of action for aiding and

abetting it would have expressly designated such liability, like other private rights of actions
under federal securities laws).
138. ML at 1449.
139.
140.
141.
142.

1& at 1451-52.
I. at 1454-55.
Id at 1455.

143.
144.

I.
Id at 1456 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
Id (StevensJ, dissenting).

145.
146.

Id. (StevensJ., dissenting).
I. at 1458 (StevensJ., dissenting).
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in private actions under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5" when it revised
the 1934 Act in 1975.147 In short, the dissent argued that Congress,
not the Court, should alter the laws if the legislature disagrees with
the prevailing standard." Finally, the statute's "broad" language,
encompassing those "indirectly" involved in violating SEC anti-fraud
and
rules, should, according to the dissent, be read "not technically
49
restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purpose."1
The Supreme Court's decision in CentralBank continues the Court's
trend of strictly construing the federal securities laws. 1- Though
aiding and abetting liability is not supported by the text of section
10(b) or Rule lOb-5, eradicating it as a private cause of action is a
potentially harmful decision as a matter of policy."' Concerned
about excessive private securities litigation, the majority chose to stick
strictly to the text of the statute instead of reading it more broadly as
suggested by the dissent' 52 As a result, the Court's decision acted
as a "blunt instrument" eliminating meritorious and nonmeritorious
lawsuits alike. 53 Wide-ranging judicial decisions of this type affect
broad categories of cases regardless of their merit and are not an
appropriate substitute for legislation that is carefully crafted to affect
Additionally, as the dissent argued,
only nonmeritorious suits."
Congress chose not to disturb the extensive case law surrounding
private aiding and abetting liability.10 The Court, therefore, should
have allowed Congress to tackle private securities litigation reform if
and when it decided to do so. Although the Court's decision will

147.

Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).

148. MEt
at 1459 (Stevens,.. dissenting).
149. I& (StevensJ., dissenting) (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 US. 128,
151 (1972)).

150. See iti. at 1445 (emphasizing that adherence to statutory language is starting point in
every case for determining scope of liability under § 10(b)).
151. See it. at 1460 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting effect of majority decision on SEC
enforcement and liability for conspiracy to violate Rule 10b-5); se also Arthur F. Mathes & IV.
Hardy Callcott, Secuities Issues Confound Court Observe, CONN. L TRIB., Aug. 1, 1994, at 16
(finding that implication of CentralBankextends well beyond core issue decided to include: (1)
lower courts' decisions implying aiding and abetting liability are no longer good law (2)
presumption that no one can be found civilly liable for conspiracy to commit Rule 10b-5
violations; and (3) potentially negative effect on SEC's enforcement actions under Rule 10b-5).
152. See CentralBank, 114 S. Ct. at 1459 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that recognition

of private cause of action for aiding and abetting liability "fits comfortably* ithin statutory
scheme).
Lauw Hcarings on the Impac of
153. See Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Fedral&Surities
the Supreme Court'sDedsion in CentralBank Beore the Subcomm. on Scuritiex of the nate Cor on
Banking, Housing,and UrbanAffairs, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), [hereinafter Aiding andAtefting
Hearings], available in 1994 NL 233142, at *2 (statement of Arthur Levitt. Chairman, SEC)
(stating that decisions like Central Bank affect broad ranges of cases regardless of their merit).

154. See it (suggesting that carefully tailored legislation should be used in place ofswveeping
judicial decisions).
155. See CentralBank 114 S. Ct. at 1456-58 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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reduce vexatious litigation, the decision has the collateral effect of
restricting the chances for recovery by injured investors in meritorious
cases.
III. THE IMPACT OF CENTRAL BAK
A.

Aiding and Abetting Liability as a Private Cause of Action

The most obvious and far reaching impact of Central Bank is the

loss of aiding and abetting liability as a private cause of action under
section 10(b). 15 6 This decision has eliminated a powerful weapon
used by private plaintiffs to reach lawyers, accountants, bankers, and
others who assisted in some degree, but may not have been directly

involved in, securities fraud.

7

Since the Supreme Court's decision,

numerous cases and complaints alleging aiding and abetting liability
have been dismissed." Law firms have been advising their clients
to take advantage of the opportunity provided by Central Bank and
seek final judgment in cases involving aiding and abetting claims
before Congress, if it should so decide, passes legislation effectively
turning back the clock." 9

156. See id. at 1455 (concluding that private plaintiff may not maintain lawsuit based upon
aiding and abetting liability under § 10(b));Joel Seligman, The Implications of Central Bank, 49

Bus. iAw.
1429, 1436 (1994) (indicating major significance of CentralBank appears to be In
§ 10(b) and Rule 101>5 cases). The CentralBank decision, however, only addresses the Issue of
private causes of action for aiding and abetting liability under § 10(b). CentralBank, 114 S. Ct.
at 1445. It does not address the issue of aiding and abetting liability under § 10(b) in regards
to SEC enforcement actions. See CongressMuffs InitiativeTo RestoreLiability Suits, INS. Accr., May

30, 1994, at 4 (stating decision did not deal specifically with SEC enforcement actions). It is
unclear whether Central Bank would apply to the SEC, but the dissent wrote that the majority
opinion "leaves little doubt that the Exchange Act does not even permit the Commission to
pursue aiders and abettors in civil enforcement actions under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5." Central
Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1460 (StevensJ., dissenting).
157. High Court Rules No PrivateRemedy for Sextion 10(b) Aiding Abetting Violation, 26 Sec. Reg.
& L Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 575, 575-76 (Apr. 22, 1994) [hereinafter High Court Rules] (stating
that decision "reverses a long line of lower court decisions and derails Section 10(b) cases
against parties, such as lawyers and accountants, alleged to have had secondary role in a
securities fraud").
158. See, eg., FMC Corp. v. Boesky, 36 F.3d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1994) (upholding dismissal of
aiding and abetting claim based on CentralBank decision); Teague v. Bakker, 35 F.3d 978, 991-95
(4th Cir. 1994) (affirrming dismissal based upon recent opinion in Central Bank), Melder v.
Morris, 27 F.3d 1097, 1104 (5th Cir. 1994) (approving dismissal of aiding and abetting claim);
Twiss v. Kury, 25 F.3d 1551, 1557-58 (11th Cir. 1994) (affirming lower court's decision to grant
summary judgment in favor of defendant on aiding and abetting claim in light of CentralBank);
Vosgerichian v. Commodore, Int'l, 862 F. Supp. 1371,1375-78 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (dismissing aiding
and abetting claim); Cortec Indus. v. Sum Holding, 839 F. Supp. 1021, 1029-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(dismissing aiding and abetting complaint with prejudice); Schultz v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust
Nat'l Bank, No. CIVA88-2870-JLT, 1994 WL 326376, at *3 (D. Mass. May 24, 1994) (dism sing
aiding and abetting claim following CentralBank).
159. See Karen Donovan, Bill Would Reverse CentralBank, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 29, 1994, at A14
(describing law firm's client memo urging defendants to avoid impact of legislation by seeking
immediate judgment).
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Although plaintiffs may attempt to invoke alternative theories to
impose liability on secondary participants, 16° without aiding and

abetting liability, it is likely that the number of securities fraud
lawsuits will decrease substantially."' Without aiding and abetting
liability, plaintiffs may be more reluctant to pursue securities fraud
cases when the likelihood of recovery does notjustify the anticipated
litigation costs." Before Central Bank, aiding and abetting liability
was often a plaintiff's best chance of recovery in financial fraud cases
because the person who actually perpetrated the fraud was usually
bankrupt or otherwise judgment proof by the time the fraud vras
discovered."es Without aiding and abetting liability, private plaintiffs
may not be able to reach those actors often in the best position to
provide a remedy-those with "deep pockets. " "' Therefore, if
plaintiffs are forced to pursue other avenues of liability with less
certain outcomes, private plaintiffs may simply choose to bring fewer
viable federal securities fraud cases." 6 By eliminating aiding and
abetting liability in private actions, CentralBank fundamentally alters
private securities litigation by restricting meritorious, as well as
nonmeritorious actions. 66

160. SeeArthurF. Mathews &W. Hardy Callcott, TighteningSut'tisLam, 137 N.J. J. 1758,
1761 (1994) (stating that Central Bank decision will force plaintiff to use new theories of
liability); see also Lisa K. Wager &John E. Failla, CentralBank ofDnve, N.A. v. FrtInterstate Bank
of Denver, N.A.-The Beginning of an End, Or IW Less Lzad to More?, 49 Bus. Iw. 1451, 1462
(1994) (explaining that plaintiffs may replead aiding and abetting claims to rely upon other
theories of secondary liability).
161. See Aiding and AbeuingHerings,supra note 153 (statement ofArthur Levitt, Chairman,
SEC), available in 1994 WL 233142, at *7 (describing negative effect of decision on prime
actions for securities fraud). But see Mathevs & Callcott, supra note 160, at 1761 (describing
potential increases in RICO claims, Blue-Sky securities statutes, and common-law fraud actions);
Wager &Failla, supra note 160, at 1456 (explaining thatshift to alternative theories ofsecondary
liability following demise of aiding and abetting liability will guarantee substantial litigation).
162. See Aidng and Abeting Hearings,supranote 153 (statement ofArthurL vitt, Charman,
SEC), available in 1994 WL 233142, at *7 (stating that ithout aiding and abetting liability,
number of cases where expected recovery does notjustify expected litigation costs will increase).
163. See Aiding and Abetting Hearn, supra note 153 (statement ofArthur Levitt, Chairman,
SEC), availablein 1994 WL 233142, at *7 (explaining that perpetrator of fraud usually becomes
bankrupt before or shortly after fraud is discovered).
164. See Aiding andAbettingHearings,supra note 153 (statement of Donald C. Langevoon),
availablein 1994 WL 233134, at *7 (stating that defendants are often named in pursuit of deep
pocket); Pitt, supra note 15, at 6 (describing targets of aiding and abetting suits as "deeppocketed").
165. SeeAiding andAbetting Headings,supranote 153 (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman,
SEC), avaiable in 1994WL 233142, at*7 (claiming that plaintiffs may not bring federal securities
fraud cases if it appears unlikely that liability can be established using theory other than aiding
and abetting).
166. S&e
Aiding and AbetingHtaring;supranote 153 (statement ofArthur Levitt, Chairman,
SEC), availablein 1994 WL 233142, at *2 (stating that decisions like Central Bank are "blunt
instruments" affecting large numbers of cases regardless of merits).
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B. Alternative Theories of Liability

Despite the loss of aiding and abetting liability as a private cause of
action, other weapons remain at the disposal of the private plaintiff.
Though perhaps not as effective as aiding and abetting liability in
reaching traditional secondary participants, other possible theories
include primary liability and alternative forms of secondary liability. 67 In the first instance, private plaintiffs may now try to pursue
lawyers, accountants, and bankers as primary violators, instead of as
aiders and abettors. The majority opinion in Central Bank expressly
stated that secondary actors could, under appropriate circumstances,
still be held liable as primary violators."6 The dissent echoed this
view. 69 Before Central Bank, the distinction between primary and
secondary liability had little tangible significance because both classes
of actors were jointly and severally liable for their misconduct. 7 ' As

a result, the dividing line between these two theories had been
described as "indistinct" and "virtually nonexistent. " '
Now, the
12
courts will have to determine the boundaries of primary liability."
In addition, they will have to determine whether categories of actors
formerly treated as aiders and abettors could remain liable as primary

167. See infra notes 17885 and accompanying text.
168. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1455. The Court stated:
The absence of Section 10(b) aiding and abetting liability does not mean that
secondary actors in the securities markets are always free from liability under the
Securities Acts. Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank who
employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on
which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under
lOb-5, assuming all of the requirements for primary liability under Rule lOb-5 are met.
Id.
169. Id. at 1459 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent further notes that this would
include accountants, lawyers, and other individuals who make oral or written misrepresentations
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. Id.
170. See Aiding and Abetting Hearings,supranote 153 (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman,
SEC), availablein 1994 WL 233142, at *4 (explaining that uncertainty exists regarding difference
between primary and secondary liability because prior to Central Bank, both types of violators
were jointly and severally liable).
171. See Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 57, at 640 (indicating that line between primary
liability and aiding and abetting liability is uncertain); see also Barker v. Henderson, Franklin,
Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490,495-96 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding that aiders and abettors can only
be found liable for securities fraud if they have same mental state required for primary liability).
172. See Seligman, supra note 156, at 1439 (explaining that CentralBankshould at least force
courts to sharpen distinction between primary and secondary liability under § 10(b)).
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a and under what circumstances this would be appropriviolators"
17 4
ate.

The courts may take an expansive view of primary liability in order
to include actors heretofore subject to aiding and abetting liability.

The few decisions that have addressed the distinction between primary
and secondary liability have shown that primary liability can have a
fairly broad scope.'75 It is far from certain, however, that the courts
will choose to expand the coverage of primary liability. In fact, the
Supreme Court's move towards a more restrictive interpretation of the
securities laws and its suggestion in Central Bank that "vexatious
litigation" influenced its decision 7 6 would seem to indicate that the
courts will restrictively interpret primary liability as well.'"
Alternative theories of secondary liability are also available.78 For
example, private plaintiffs could attempt to reach secondary actors
through "controlling person,"'7 "respondeat superior," " and

173. See Seligman, supra note 156, at 1439-41 (arguing that certain types of actors are more
likely to be held primarily liable than others, namely accountants, whereas lawyers, brokerdealers, and bankers are less likely). Accountants will more likely be held primarily liable
compared to other professionals because they sign financial reports. Id
174. SeeWager & Failla, supr note 160, at 1456 (explaining that most significant obstacles
to repleading aiding and abetting claims as primary violations will be requirements that plaintiff
plead and prove that defendant owed duty to plaintiff, acted with scienter, and that plaintiff
relied upon defendant's actions).
175. Se, ag., MolecularTechnology Corp. v.Valentine, 925 F.2d 910, 917-18 (6th Cir. 1991)
(holding that attorneywho reviewed and edited disclosure materials to assist client could be held
liable as primary, not secondary, actor in alleged wrongdoing); wz also SEC v. Washington
County Util. Dist., 676 F.2d 218, 223-24 (6th Cir. 1982) (finding that primary liability does not
require direct contact); In re Rospatch Sec. Litig., 802 F. Supp. 110, 115 (W.D. Mich. 1992)
(refusing to dismiss complaint against law firm alleging primary and secondary liability for
securities fraud).
176. CentralBank, 114 S. Ct. at 1454.
177. See Aiding and Abeting Hcafings, supranote 153 (statement of Donald C. Langevoort).
availablein 1994 WL 233142, at *3 (suggesting courts may interpret scope of primary liability
narrowly instead of expansively because of concern over excessive private securities litigation);
Seligman, supra note 156, at 1439 (claiming that given recent trend of narrowing scope of
securities laws, it is impossible to predict to what extent former aders and abetters may be
primarily liable).
Congress could preempt the courts and mandate a restrictive interpretation of primary
liability even before the courts get a chance to consider the issue. H.R. 1058, passed by the
House of Representatives on March 8, 1995, narrowly defines scienter so that "liability may be
established only on proof that (a) the defendant directly or indirectly made a fraudulent
statement; (b) the defendant possessed the intention to deceive, manipulate, or defraud; and
(c) the defendant made such fraudulent statement knowingly or recklessly." H.R. 1078, Sec. 4,
§ 1OA(a) (1), 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
178. See infra notes 180-93 and accompanying text.
179. Sesupra notes 9-11 and accompanying text (defining controlling persons and control
person liability); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1988) (providing that any person who controls another
party is liable for his actions unless control person has no knowledge or reasonable grounds for
belief). Though control person liability might be able to replace aiding and abetting liability
in some cases, it will not be able to do so entirely. Wager & Failla, supra note 160, at 1465.
Specifically, it will be difficult to satisfy all of the elements of controlling person liability in suits
against attorneys, outside directors, and bankers. Id.
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conspiracy 181 theories of secondary liability. As the dissent suggested, however, CentralBank raised some doubt regarding the continued
availability of these other forms of secondary liability,18 2 particularly
conspiracy and respondeat superior liability.183 While "controlling
persons" liability is specifically addressed in section 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act, "respondeat superior" and other related
agency theories are not, and therefore, remain at risk in light of the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Central Bank." In fact, at least one
lower court has held that conspiracy liability, which is a form of
agency theory, is no longer available as a cause of action in securities
fraud.185
C. Aiding and Abetting Liability as a Deterrent
If private plaintiffs choose not to pursue their federal securities
claims, many injured investors will be left without a remedy and the
SEC Will lose a "necessary supplement" to its enforcement efforts. 8 '

180. Fischel, supra note 19, at 86. "Respondeat superior" is a common law theory of
secondary liability whereby "employers are strictly liable for the improper acts of their employees
committed within the scope of their employment." Id. This theory allows plaintiffs to recover

from employers for the actions of their employees regardless of whether the employer acted in
"good faith" under § 15 and § 20(a) of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Id.
181. Wager & Failla, supra note 160, at 1463. In order to establish a claim of conspiracy to
violate § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the plaintiff must allege and prove that:
(1) An agreement between two or more persons to commit an unlavftul act in an
unlawful manner,
(2) An overt act committed by one of the persons to the agreement in furtherance
of the common scheme; and
(3) Injury resulting from the overt act.
Id. (citing Halberstamn v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
182. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1460 (Stevens,J., dissenting). The dissent suggests that tie
"majority's approach to aiding and abetting at the very least casts serious doubt, both to private
and SEC actions, on other forms of secondary liability that, like the aiding and abetting theory,
have long been recognized by the SEC and the courts but are not expressly spelled out In tle
securities laws" such as conspiracy, respondeat superior, and other common law agency
principles. Id.
183. Wager & Failla, supra note 160, at 1462 (suggesting that causes of action based on
common law doctrine of respondeat superior and other related doctrines must be questioned
if not rejected following CentralBank); see also Seligman, supranote 156, at 1435-36 (concluding
that loss of conspiracy liability in securities fraud would be insignificant and that loss of
respondeat superior liability would be only slightly more significant).
184. See Aiding and AbettingHearings, supra note 153 (statement of Donald C. Langevoort),
availablein 1994 WL 233142, at *4 (finding respondeat superior and other common law theories
of liability at risk following CentralBank because these theories are not specifically provided for
by statute); Wager & Failla, supranote 160, at 1462-63 (claiming that Court's strict reliance on
statute in Central Bank to define scope of conduct prohibited requires that liability based on
common law secondary liability principles be rejected).
185. See In re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 885 F. Supp. 1086, 1098 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (dismissing
both aiding and abetting and conspiracy liability theory claims as result of CentralBank).
186. See Aiding and Abetting Hearings supra note 153 (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman,
SEC), availablein 1994 WI. 233142, at *10 (testifying that private actions have served to both
complement SEC enforcement activities and compensate injured investors).
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A situation that allows defrauded investors to go uncompensated due
to a lack of effective and equitable private remedies may lead to
decreased investor confidence in the "fairness of the securities
markets.""'7 Additionally, a decrease in meritorious lawsuits may
significantly reduce the effectiveness of private actions as a means of
deterrence.ss Though the SEC devotes considerable resources to
identifying and confronting violators of the federal securities laws, it
is increasingly unable to proceed with every meritorious enforcement

Private actions, therefore, play a substantial role in
action. 1"
deterring potential violators. These private plaintiffs act as "tens of
thousands of private attorneys general" enforcing the securities
laws. 19 ° Without aiding and abetting liability under section 10(b),9
the most prevalent private cause of action before Central Bank,'

these "private attorneys general" will not be in the courts deterring
fraudulent conduct."
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

A.

ProposedLegislation

The decision in Central Bank eliminated a private cause of action
widely used by investors and other securities market participants."
Further, it has created uncertainty as to aiding and abetting liability's
19
continued availability to the SEC in public enforcement actions. '

187. See Aiding and Abetting Hearings, supranote 153 (statement ofArthur Levitt, Chairman,
SEC), availablein 1994 W.L 233142, at *10 (stating that effective private remedies are essential
to investor confidence in fairness of securities markets).
188. See Seligman, supra note 156, at 1441 (suggesting that Central Bank decision will
eliminate private and possibly SEC actions for aiding and abetting under § 10(b) and Rule 10b5, which will reduce deterrent effect of these provisions for accountants, and for attorneys,
broker-dealers, and bankers in particular).
189. See Aiding and AbettingHearing supranote 153 (statement ofArthur Levitt, Chairman.
SEC), availablein 1994 WIL 233142, at *10-11 (testifying that despite devoting significant assets
to confronting violations of securities laws, SEC cannot pursue every case).
190. See High Couit Rule, supranote 157, at 575 (quoting Rep. Edimrd Markey (D.Ma-ss),
then-Chairman of House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Telecommunications and
Finance).
191. See Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 57, at 639 (stating that aiding and abetting
liability is theory most widely used to hold nonprivity parties and other secondary participants
responsible for violations of securities laws).
192. See Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 57, at 640.45 (discussing aiding and abetting
liability).
193. Sesupranote 191 and accompanying text (discussingprevalence ofaidingandabetting
liability).
194. See supra note 156 (suggesting that even though Central Bank was limited to private
actions, aiding and abetting liability is unavailable to SEC in enforcement actions). Though
CentralBank did not specifically apply to the SEC, the SEC has chosen to voluntarily dismiss or
withdraw most of its complaints alleging aiding and abetting liability. Siz Mathes & Callcott,
supranote 160, at 1759 (indicating that SEC has dismissed or replaced aiding and abettingsuits
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To address these problems and other concerns raised by CentralBank,
Congress should take action to ensure the continued smooth and
effective operation of the federal securities laws.
1.

Aiding and abetting liability

First, Congress should legislatively overrule the decision in Central
Bank. Legislation should be introduced amending the 1934 Act
making aiding and abetting liability available to both the SEC and to
private plaintiffs under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.11 Legislation
similar to that introduced on July 22, 1994 by then-Sen. Howard
Metzenbaum196 would have satisfied this particular need. Congress,
however, would be remiss if it simply stopped there. Merely adding
the words "aiding and abetting liability" to the statute will not

adequately address the scope of this important cause of action. Such
language would allow restrictive interpretation by the courts. Without
more precise language to guide them, the courts may interpret aiding
and abetting liability so strictly as to make it barely distinguishable
from primary liability, thereby rendering such legislation effectively
meaningless."x Instead, Congress should provide guidance to the
courts regarding the direction and development of aiding and

in wake of CentralBank); see also SEC v. Patel, 1994 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 98,340 (SD.N,Y
July 12, 1994) (allowing voluntary dismissal of aiding and abetting complaint by SEC); SEC v.
Militano, 1994 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 98,330 (S.D.N.Y.June 23, 1994) (permitting SEC to
voluntarily dismiss aiding and abetting complaint).
195. See Aiding and Abetting Hearings,supranote 153 (statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd),
availablein 1994 WL 233120, at *3 (calling for prompt, but carefully crafted, legislative response
to Central Bank); id (statement of Harvey Goldschmid), available in 1994 WL 233132, at *6
(recommending overruling Central Bank as quickly as practicable); id. (statement of Mark
Griffin), available in 1994 WL 233147, at *7 (recommending limited legislation to overrule
CentralBank); id (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC), availablein 1994 WL 233142, at
*2 (suggesting that Congress pass legislation addressing decision in CentralBank);id. (statement
of David Ruder), available in 1994 WL 233136, at *7-8 (suggesting that Congress pass more
comprehensive legislation when reversing Central Bank); Seligman, supra note 156, at 1446
(recommending Congress adopt legislation restoring aiding and abetting liability in private and
SEC § 10(b) cases).
196. See S. 2306, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (amending 1934 Act to include aiding and
abetting liability). Sen. Metzenbaum's bill, called the "Securities Fraud Fairness Act," sought to
amend § 10(b) of the 1934 Act by inserting the words, "or to aid and abet the use or employ
of any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance," before the words "in contravention,"
Id.
197. See Aiding and Abetting Hearings,supra note 153 (statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd),
availablein 1994 WL 233120, at *3 (stating that any legislation responding to Central Bank must
be carefully tailored so as to avoid new round of dismemberment by courts); id. (statement of
David S. Ruder), availablein 1994 WL 233136, at *7-8 (indicating that if Congress provides no
guidance, courts may interpret aiding and abetting doctrine differently than what Congress
would want); David S. Ruder, The Future ofAiding and Abetting and Rule 10b.5 After CentralBank
ofDenver, 49 Bus. LAW. 1479, 1485 (1994) (suggesting that Congress should codify elements of
aiding and abetting liability because language of CentralBank suggests that Supreme Court may
not agree with federal circuit courts in interpretation of aiding and abetting liability).
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abetting liability, and thereby reduce the possibility of future
problems or conflicts. H.R. 555," a bill introduced by Rep. Edward
Markey (D-Mass.) on January 18, 1995 to reform private securities
legislation, made such an effort to guide the courts with the language
it used to reinstate aiding and abetting liability in securities fraud."
The elements of aiding and abetting liability should be clearly
defined in legislation addressing this theory."t The three elements
should be: (1) primary violation of the securities laws (section
10(b)/Rule 10b-5) by another party, (2) knowledge of the primary
violation; and (3) substantial assistance in effecting the primary
violation. 20 ' This formulation would codify the position held by a

198.

H.R. 555, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).

199. See id. sec. 103 (restoring aiding and abetting liability by amending 1933 Act. 1934 Act,
Investment Company Act, and Investment Advisors Act). HIM 555 attempted to restore aiding
and abetting liability to each of the major securities acts by adding the following language:
Prosecution of Persons Who Aid or Abet Violations... [Any person who knowingly
or recklessly provides substantial assistance to another person in the violation of a
provision of this tide, or of any rule or regulation hereunder, shall be deemed to
violate such provision to the same extent as the person to whom such assistance is
provided. No person shall be liable under this subsection based on an omission or
falure to act unless such omission or failure constituted a breach ofduty owed by such
person.
Id.

Of the several private securities litigation reform bills that were before Congress this session,
one other, Hit 681, attempted to reinstate aiding and abetting liability in securities fraud. Hit
681, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. sec. 3, § 20B(f) (1995). Introduced by Rep. Billy Tauzin (D-.L) on
January 25,1995, the bill sought to reinstate a more limited form ofaiding and abetting liability
than under H.it 555. Specifically, H.R 681 tried to reinstate aiding and abetting liability in
securities fraud by adding the following language to § 20 of the 1934 Act:
[A] defendant may be held liable as an aider and abettor only if the plaintiff proves
that the defendant knew that another party had violated a provision of this Act and
that the defendant, acting with deliberate intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud for
the defendant's own direct pecuniary benefit, provided substantial assistance to the
other party's violation.
iL Unlike H.it 555, H.R. 681 effectively eliminated recklessness as a sufficient standard for
scienter due to the deliberate intent requirement. Additionally, H.R. 681 tried to further limit
those that could be held liable as aiders and abetters by including a requirement that the
defendant received a direct pecuniary benefit, not to include "ordinary compensation for
services provided." H.R. 681 sec. 3, § 20B(f).
200.

See Aiding and Abeting Hearings, supra note 153 (statement of Harvey Goldschmid),

availablein 1994WL 233132, at *6-7 (calling for legislation defining aiding and abetting liability
by its traditional elements); Ruder, supra note 197, at 1484 (suggesting that one wvay Congress
could react to CentralBank is to reinstate aiding and abetting liability and explicitly set forth
elements of aiding and abetting liability in so doing).
201. See H.R 555 sec. 103(a), § 20(f) (defining alder or abettor as "any person who

knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance to another person in the violation of a
provision of this titie"); see also Aiding and Aling Hearing;supranote 153 (statement of Harvey
Goldschmid), availabLe in 1994 WL 233132, at *6 (listing elements of aiding and abetting
liability); supranote 54 and accompanying text (listing elements of aiding and abetting liability);
c. H.R. 681 Sec. 3, § 20B(f) (proposing that elements of aiding and abetting liability be that
defendant knew another party had violated securities laws, defendant acted with deliberate
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud for direct personal pecuniary benefit, and that
defendant "provided substantial assistance to other party's violation").
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majority of circuit courts" 2 before the decision in Central Bank.
Congress should also delineate a uniform standard that satisfies the
knowledge/scienter requirement. 0 To establish culpability as an
aider and abettor under section 10(b), the amendment should
indicate that "recklessness "2 4 with respect to a primary violation
satisfies the knowledge requirement, even absent a duty of disclosure
to the defrauded party.0 5 If, however, liability is premised on an
omission or failure to act, as opposed to an affirmative act, a breach
of duty to the defrauded party should be required for liability.206

202. Seesupranotes 54-56 and accompanying text (discussing elements of aiding and abetting
liability and majority view).
203. See Riesenberg, supra note 126 and accompanying text (indicating issue originally
requested for certiorari was knowledge issue). The issue of whether recklessness or actual
knowledge satisfied scienter under § 10(b) was the question originally petitioned for review by
the Supreme Court in CentralBank. 1d. When the Court decided in Central Bank that aiding
and abetting liability is unavailable as a private cause of action, the issue regarding scienter was
left unaddressed. See Aiding and Abetting Hearings, supra note 153 (statement of Harvey
Goldschmid), available in 1994 WL 233132, at *6.
204. "Recklessness" should also be defined by statute, rather than being left up to judicial
interpretation. The codified definition of recklessness should be based on a widely accepted and
cited version. One such version describes recklessness as:
a highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable
negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and that
presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant
or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.
Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth,, 428 F. Supp. 719,725 (W.D. Okla. 1976), vacated on other
grounds,619 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1980); see Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033,
1045 (7th Cir.) (adoptingFrankedefinition as standard), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); see also
Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 460-61 (8th Cir. 1991) (adopting Sunstrandstandard); Hollinger
v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1569 n.8 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (following Sundstrand
standard), crt. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1621 (1991); Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 961
(5th Cir.) (en banc) (adopting Sunstrand as controlling standard), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965
(1981).
H.R. 1058, the only private securities litigation reform bill to be passed by the House of
Representatives this session, incorporates a definition of recklessness drawn from Sunstrand.
H.R. 1058, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., sec. 4, § 10A(a) (14) (1995); see also Hous Amends and Passes
Legislationto Reform PrivateSecuritiesLitigation,Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), at A46 (Mar. 9,
1995) [hereinafter House PassesLegislation] (indicating definition in bill is based on Sunstrand).
This definition details the standard of liability for reckless conduct in a primary violation under
§ 10(b) of the 1934 Act. See House Passes Legislation, infra, at A46 (explaining application of
recklessness definition). Neither the bill's definition of recklessness nor the bill as a whole apply
to or incorporate aiding and abetting liability.
205. See H.R. 555 sec. 103, § 20(f) (providing that one who "knowingly or recklessly" aids
primary violation of securities laws will be liable as aider and abettor); see also McDermott, supra
note 32, at 1112 (explaining that wholesale application of recklessness standard provides best
protection for investor); Ruder, supra note 197, at 1485 (recommending that legislation Indicate
that recklessness satisfies scienter requirement but that recklessness must be so severe that It
approaches intent to defraud). But see H.R. 681 sec. 3, § 20B(f) (requiring deliberate intent to
deceive thereby effectively eliminating recklessness as sufficient standard for scienter in aiding
and abetting liability); cf.H.R. 1058, sec. 4, § 1OA(a) (proposing that both actual knowledge and
recklessness be appropriate standards for scienter in primary action under § 10(b) but not
providing for aiding and abetting liability).
206. Section 103 of H.R. 555 would also require that an omission or failure to act constitute
a breach of duty owed to the defrauded party by the alleged aider and abetter in order for the
omission or failure to act to be actionable under any of the amended sections of the securities
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Recklessness is the appropriate standard for scienter because it
discourages deliberate ignorance and prevents defendants from
escaping liability because of what is often an impossible task of
proving actual knowledge based on circumstantial evidence-usually
the only type of evidence available."'7 Recklessness, as defined in
this Comment,2°0 would require a high degree of culpability in
order to establish liability, but it would not be so limiting so as to
impede the vigorous enforcement of the law. 2
2. Limited securities litigation reform

Congress should also use this opportunity to pursue some form of
limited private securities litigation reform. Specifically, Congress
should abandon pure joint and several liability21° in those lawsuits
relying on aiding and abetting, and instead, adopt a system combining
both proportionate and joint and several liability. For cases alleging
a primary violation of the securities laws,joint and several liability for
all primary violators should be left intact. Under this proposal, once
a plaintiff has satisfied all of the elements of aiding and abetting
liability and culpability has been established, the knowledge element
would become the controlling factor with respect to damage
apportionment.
In this respect, a two-tier approach combining both joint and
several and proportionate liability should be adopted for resolving
damage apportionment in those cases where the aider and abettor was
only reckless."' If the knowledge element is satisfied by the minimum standard of recklessness, rather than the higher standard of
actual knowledge, a second inquiry will need to be made: what was
the aider and abettor's degree of fault?212 Legislation should

laws. H.R 555 sec. 103.
207. Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 9, Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. CL 1439 (1994) (No. 92-54)
[hereinafter SEC Brief].
208. See supra note 204 (defining "recklessness").
209. See SEC Brief, supranote 207 (indicating advantages of recklessness standard).
210. S eSTuART h. SPEISER ET AL, THE AMERICAN LAW OF ToRTs § 3.6 (1983 & Supp. 1994)
(explaining that joint and several liability is common law doctrine that holds each tortfewor

separately and personally liable for all damages arising from injury where harm to .ictim is
indivisible, even though injury results from tortious acts of more than one tortfeasor).
211. Cf Seligman, supranote 156, at 1446 (recommending that aidingand abetting fiability
be restored, but that all alders and abetters be limited to proportionate liability except in
circumstance where bankrupt primary violator has not been adequately insured).
212. The degree of fault or responsibility wil be determined by the jury, or the court if there
is nojury. The method of making this determination could be very similar to that proposed in

the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, S. 240, 104th Cong., Ist Sem. sec. 203, and
the Securities Litigation Reform Act, H.R. 1058, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. sec. 4, § 10A(e) (1995).
Specific legislation should include language to the effect that if the knowledge element of an
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indicate that if an aider and abettor is found to be more than twenty
percent at fault for the fraud in relation to the other defendants, the
aider and abettor will be jointly and severally liable. On the other
hand, if the aider and abettor's degree of fault for the violation is
twenty percent or less, the aider and abettor will only be liable for a
proportion of the total damages equal to his relative degree of
responsibility.21 The cutoff level of twenty percent is an arbitrary
figure above which the defendant should be considered a significant

participant in the fraud, and below which a minor participant. This
mixture ofjoint and several liability and proportionate liability closely
resembles similar schemes established by some states to control
14
damage liability in negligence or fault-based personal injury cases.

aiding and abetting violation is satisfied by recklessness:
the court shall instruct the jury to answer special interrogatories, or if there is no jury,
shall make findings, concerning the degree of responsibility of each person alleged to
have caused or contributed to the violation of this title, including persons who have
entered into settlements with the plaintiff. The interrogatories or findings shall specify
the amount of damages the plaintiff is entitled to recover and the degree of
responsibility, measured as a percentage of the total fault ofall persons involved in the
violation, ofeach person found to have caused or contributed to the damages incurred
by the plaintiff or plaintiffs. In determining the degree of responsibility, the trier of
fact shall consider(1) the nature of the conduct of each person; and
(2) the nature and extent of the causal relationship between that conduct and the
damage claimed by the plaintiff.
S. 240 sec. 203, § 41(c); H.R. 1058 sec. 4, § 10A(e). Additionally, the Supreme Court recently
affirmed a proportionate liability formula for nonsettling defendants in an admiralty case,
McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1461, 1464-66 (1994). This approach could also
be used as a means of determining a defendant's proportionate share. See Seligman, supranote
156, at 1444-45 (discussing use of "proportionate share" approach in aiding and abetting
liability).
213. This approach can best be illustrated by the following example. A securities fraud case
is decided in which a $10 million judgment is entered against three defendants: A, B, and G
A, as the primary violator, is found to be 60% liable, while B and C, each an aider and abettor,
are found to be 30% and 10% at fault, respectively. Before the judgment is collected, A Is
insolvent and declares bankruptcy. Under the legislation proposed in this Comment, assuming
C was merely reckless, C would be liable for only its one million dollar proportionate share
because its degree of responsibility is under 20%. B, on the other hand, as the more culpable
defendant, would be liable for the remaining nine million dollars, made up of his proportionate
share of three million dollars, as well as A's six million dollar share. If, however, C was not
reckless but had actual knowledge of the fraud, Cwould bejoint and severally liable with A for
the entire judgment. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS,
103D CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON PRivATE SECURmES LmGATION 127-28 (Comm. Print 1994)
[hereinafter STAFF REPORT ON LIGATION REFORM] (demonstrating combined joint and

several/proportionate liability approach). But cf. S. 240 sec. 203, § 41(b) (1) (proposingjolnt
and several liability only for defendants who are primary wrongdoers, engaged in knowing
securities fraud, or controlling primary wrongdoer, regardless of percentage of fault); H.R. 1058
sec. 4, § 10A(e) (proposingjoint and several liability only for primary wrongdoers who knowingly
engage in securities fraud regardless oftotal fault); H.R. 681 sec. 3, § 20B(a) (2) (proposing that
defendant who does not engage in knowing securities fraud can only be liable to degree of his
responsibility for violation, regardless of percentage of fault).
214. See STAFF REPORT ON ITGATION REFORM, supranote 213, at 126 n.324 (indicating that
in some states, proportionate liability applies when defendant's degree of responsibility falls
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If, on the other hand, a defendant engages in "knowing securities
fraud,"" 5 then joint and several liability will apply.216 This particu-

lar recommendation is consistent with more extensive attempts to
reform private enforcement of the federal securities laws by Representatives Thomas Bliley (R-Va.), Jack Fields (R-Tex.), Christopher Cox
(R-Cal.), and Wfilliam Tauzin (D-La.),217 and Senators Christopher

Dodd (D-Conn.) and Pete Domenici (R-N.M.)."' These bills,
however, which are more limiting than the legislation proposed in this
Comment,2 1 9 specifically exclude recklessness from joint and several
liability.220 Such legislation would unfairly limit the compensation

that an investor could receive for injuries caused by the reckless
conduct of a substantial participant. Though a minor participant in
a fraud should not be held entirely responsible for a judgment,

below certain level); see, eg., ILL REV. STAT. ch. 735, para. 5/2-1117 (1993) (allowing
proportionate liability for defendants less than 25% responsible for nonmedical expenses in
personal injury and product liability cases); IOWA CODE § 668.4 (1987) (imposing proportionate
liability on defendants less than 50% responsible); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.485 (1993) (allowing
proportionate liability only when defendant is less than 15% liable); W. VA CODE § 29-12A.-7
(1992) (indicating that proportionate liability will apply only when defendant is less than 257
responsible).
215. "Knowing securities fraud" as defined by proposed legislation in the Senate is either a
.material representation with [defendant's] actual knowledge that the representation is false"
or an omission, "with [defendant's] actual knowledge that, as a result of the omission, one of
the defendant's material representations is false and [defendant] knows that other persons are
likely to rely on that misrepresentation or omission." S. 240 sec. 203(a), § 41(b)(2)(B)(i).
Under the legislation passed by the House of Representatives, a defendant "knowingly" makes
a fraudulent statement if the defendant "knew that the statement of a material fact was untrue
at the time it was made, or knew that an omitted fact was necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances in which theywere made, not misleading." H.R.
1058 sec. 4, § 10A(a) (3).
216. SeeS. 240 sec. 3, § 20A(a) (1) (requiring that joint and several liability apply to those
engaging in knowing securities fraud); HR.1058 sec. 4. § 10A(e) (1) (proposing thatjoint and
several liability apply to those engaged in knowing securities fraud); H.R. 681 Sec. 3, § 20B(a) (1)
(suggesting thatjoint and several liability apply to those engaging in knowing securities fraud).
217. See H.R. 1058 sec. 4, § 10A(e) (proposing several changes to private securities litigation
including that only defendants engaging in knowing securities fraud be jointly and severally
liable and those who are reckless be proportionately liable). HR. 1058 %uspassed by the House
of Representatives in a 325-99 vote on March 8, 1995. House PassesLegislalion, supra note 204,
at A46.
218. See S. 240 sec. 203(a), § 41 (proposing several changes to private securities litigation
including that defendants engaging in knowing securities fraud, primary rvTongdoers and those
controlling primary wrongdoers, bejointly and severally liable). S.240 vs passed by the Senate
in a 70-29 vote on June 28, 1995. Much Debated S&zwiier LitigationBill B,_e- Through Senate by
70 to 29 Vote, Daily Report for Executives (BNA), atA125 (June 29, 1995).
219. In addition to specifically excluding all reckless conduct from joint and several liability,
these bills fail to reinstate aiding and abetting liability. SeS. 240 (failing to mention aiding and
abetting liability); H.R. 1058 (failing to reinstate aiding and abetting liability anyw,'here in its
provisions).
220. See S. 240 sec. 203, § 41(b) (2) (B) (i) (stating that "knowing securities fraud" does not
include reckless conduct); H.R. 1058 sec. 4, § 10A(e) (1) (stating that defendant 'may be liable
jointly and severally only if the trier of fact specifically determines that the defendant acted
knowingly"); HJL 681 sec. 3, § 20B(a)(3) (stating that "reckless conduct by the defendant shall
not be construed to constitute 'knowing securities fraud'").
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a fraud should not be held entirely responsible for a judgment,
neither should a substantial participant escape the responsibility of
making an injured party whole simply because his conduct was merely
reckless. If responsibility for damages is to fall upon the shoulders of
a particular party, it should be on the more culpable significant
participant and not on the innocent plaintiff or minor participant.
Therefore, instead of eliminating joint and several liability in
securities fraud cases involving reckless conduct altogether, Congress
should merely limit it as proposed in this Comment.
Finally, this legislation should include two remaining provisions.
First, a defendant's right to contribution 221 should be expressly
provided for within the statute. This provision would codify the
Supreme Court's holding in Mussik, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers
Insurance of Wausau,222 which found that defendants in a Rule 10b-5
223
suit have a right to seek contribution as a matter of federal law.

Second, this legislation should clearly indicate that the newly added
aiding and abetting provisions of section 10(b) and the "controlling
person" provisions of section 15 of the 1933 Act and section 20(a) of
the 1934 Act are the exclusive means of establishing secondary liability
persons other than primary
and for providing remedies against
224
violators in securities fraud cases.
B. Advantages of Legislative Reform
The approach to civil liability in aiding and abetting securities fraud
proposed in this Comment has several advantages. First, aiders and
abettors on the fringe of a securities violation will be held responsible
to the degree that they advanced or were responsible for the fraud,
provided that their degree of responsibility is twenty percent or
less. 21 Typically, aiding and abetting defendants are professionals
whose roles in a fraud have been secondary. 226 In the past, such
secondary participants had often been forced to pay entirejudgments
221. See STAFF REPORT ON LITIGATION REFoRMi, supra note 213, at 120 (describing doctrine
of contribution). Under the doctrine of contribution, each tortfeasor (defendant) may seek
reimbursement from the other persons who are jointly liable with him for a plaintiffs damages
to recover any payment to the plaintiff for liability in excess of that tortfeasor's proportionate
share based on fault. Id.
222. 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993).
223. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins., 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2089-92 (1993).
224. See Aiding andAbetting Heasings,supranote 153 (statement of David S. Ruder), available
in 1994 WL 233136, at *8 (recommending that Congress indicate in new legislation that aiding
and abetting and "controlling person" theories are only theories of secondary liability In federal
securities laws).
225. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text (discussing 20% liability cutoff).
226. See Sager, supra note 59, at 821 (indicating that lenders, brokers, accountants, and
others in similar positions are usually targets of secondary liability allegations).
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because they werejointly and severally liable with the primary violator
and the primary violator was bankrupt.Y Because these defendants
could become responsible for all the damage caused by the primary
violator, secondary defendants frequently settled for significant sums
in order to avoid the onerous possibility of liability for the entire
amount claimed.'
With this change, true aiders and abettors will
only be responsible to the extent that they furthered the violation, as
long as their relative degree of responsibility is less than twenty
percent. Secondary actors who significantly assist a violation will still
face joint and several liability. As a result, innocent plaintiffs are still
made whole by aiders and abettors who either had actual knowledge
or were significant participants. Additionally, plaintiffs are able to
recover proportionate damages from minor aiders and abettors. This
change would serve to balance the objective in the measurement of
damages in securities fraud litigation between compensation and
deterrence. 9
This change in damage liability for alders and abettors under
section 10(b) may also have a two-fold deterrent effect. First, by
reinstating aiding and abetting liability, potential alders and abettors
of securities fraud will likely be deterred from assisting violations of
the securities laws even though their damage liability could be
Second, by limiting damage liability to a proportionate
limited.2
share in certain cases, nonmeritorious lawsuits will be discouraged as
a result of the potentially smaller recovery, via settlement or otherwise, that a plaintiff could expect to receive from an aider and
abettor." t Therefore, a combined proportionate/joint and several
liability apportionment scheme may help stem the tide of vexatious
litigation and focus the search by some plaintiffs for the so-called

227. See Aiding and Abeting Hearing-%supranote 153 (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman,
SEC), available in 1994 WL 233142, at *13 (explaining that often primary violator becomes

insolvent by time fraud is discovered).
228. See Aiding andAbettingHearings supranote 153 (statement of Daid S. Ruder), aailable
in 1994 WL 233134, at *4 (explaining that large securities suits have been settled for significant
sums because of fear by defendants of being jointly and severally liable for entire amount
claimed).
229. Cf Aking and AbddngHeadings,supranote 153 (statement of Donald C. Langevoor),

available in 1994 WL 233134, at *8 (stating that move from joint and several liability to
proportionate liability will shift nature of damages in securities suits from primarily compensatory to deterrence objective).
230. Cf. Aiding and AbetingHeaings,supranote 153 (statement of Donald C. Langevoort),
availablein 19941WL 233134, at *8 (suggesting that carefully crafted liability scheme %%illbe able
to address fairness and disproportion without compromising deterrence).
231. Cf Aing andAbeingHearings supra note 153 (statement of Donald C. Langevoort).
available in 1994 WL 233134, at *8-9 (stating that current litigation incentives are such that
money spent in litigation and settlement of securities fraud cases is "untied to underlying merits
of the actions").
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"deep pocket" defendant on more culpable persons.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in CentralBank will have a tremendous impact on securities law litigation. It has eliminated what was
previously one of the most heavily relied upon causes of action in
private lawsuits. Without it, defrauded investors risk the inability to
recover compensation and secondary participants in fraudulent
activities no longer face what had been a usually effective deterrent.
Therefore, in order to restore the private investors' ability to pursue
meritorious aiding and abetting claims, Congress should act to restore
this private cause of action, giving private investors the necessary tools
to protect themselves from securities fraud, and in so doing, help
maintain investor confidence in the fairness of the securities markets.
The proposals in this Comment do not seek to reform the entire
system of private securities litigation. Instead, this proposed legislation is limited to tackling secondary liability in securities fraud.
Unfortunately, the Securities Litigation Reform Act (H.R. 1058),
which was passed by the House of Representatives on March 8, 1995,
and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (S. 240), which was
passed by the Senate of June 28, 1995, do not contain provisions
reinstating aiding and abetting liability. Despite a last-minute effort
by Senator Richard Bryan (D-Nev.) to amend S. 240 and include
aiding and abetting liability,' the restoration of this cause of action
has not been included in the current round of securities reform.
Though aiding and abetting liability is not likely to be approved by
the current Congress, every effort should be made to eventually
restore aiding and abetting liability and legislatively overrule Central
Bank before too many defrauded investors are left without a forum.

232. Senate Defeats Major Proposed Amendments to LitigationReformn Measure, Daily Report for
Executives (BNA), at A-124 (June 28, 1995) (indicating Bryan Amendment that would have
reinstated aiding and abetting liability and securities fraud was defeated by vote of 39 to 60).

